Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎196v] (392/442)

465 The, Trans-Persian Railway. [ LORDS ] The Trans-Persian Railway. 466
I may be pardoned for saying that even
in this breathless and staggering age I am
too slow to be able to make these rapid
changes myself. I am too slow to be willing
to abandon, almost at a moment’s notice,
all the convictions of my lifetime about
Indian defence, all the teachings of all our
Generals and Statesmen and Viceroys
during the last fifty years, all the accepted
dogmas of both political Parties in this
country. Before His Majesty’s Government
invite us to take such a step—I do not, of
course, say they will do so—but before they
contemplate inviting us to take such a step
I hope they will think, not once, or twice, or
twenty times, but a hundred times. I hope
they will show better reasons than they have
up to now advanced, and I hope they will
give us the opinions of their military
advisers on the matter. When I was in
India a few years ago a scheme, almost
identical with this which I have been
examining, and which was at that time
identified with a Russian officer named
Captain Rittich, was sent out to us in
India to be reported upon by the Govern
ment of India. We advised very strongly
against it, and if I remember aright no
one was more strong about it than Lord
Kitchener, the then Commander-in-Chief.
What is the opinion of the Government
of India now ? What are the opinions of the
military authorities in India and in this
country ? What is the advice of the
Committee of . Imperial Defence ? Sir
Edward Grey has been asked in the House
of Commons for the opinions of his military
advisers, but has answered as if the opinions
of those officers were secret oracles which
belonged to the Government to be treasured
up by them and not revealed to any one
else. I do not take that view of the
opinions of our military advisers. Our
military advisers are paid by the nation, and
their views on matters of great urgency like
this are, in my opinion, the property of the
nation. That was the case in regard to the
Channel Tunnel. There the military
advisers were examined before a Parlia
mentary Committee ; and if that was done
in a matter affecting the security of England,
surely we have a right to demand the same
in a matter affecting the security of India.
One other point before I pass away from
strategy. The strategical danger to India
is not confined to the opening of her frontiers
in the manner I have described. There are
many people who fear that we shall be
Earl Curzon of Kedleston.
drawn forward into the open and driven
to undertake responsibilities which I am
sure every one of us would wish to avoid.
; We may very likely find ourselves, with
i this great railway running through Persia,
compelled to send out garrisons to deiend it
without the soldiers in India to do it and
without the money which would render such
a scheme possible. I do not regard such a
situation as fantastic. Let us conceive
what might very likely arise. It might
very well be, the railway having been con
structed, that the Persian Government
would be powerless to guarantee its security.
Russia would obviously—and I do not say
wrongly—undertake the policing of that
portion of the line which affected her. What
about the railway that lay in our sphere ?
We could not tolerate Russian guards in our
sphere. We should inevitably be compelled
to take similar steps on our own side ; and
it seems to me not unlikely that in this way
our Government, whose one desire has been
to keep out of these complications, might
have to send Indian soldiers to Persia.
So much for the question of strategy.
Is there any other way in which India
would benefit by the construction of this
railway ? There is the question of the
acceleration of the mails. I dare say there
would be some acceleration of mails—a
reduction of two or three days, though I
doubt very much whether the Government
would welcome the transmission of Indian
mails exclusively through foreign countries
in the future, and in the event of war 1
imagine that such an arrangement would
have to be suspended at once. There mav
be some convenience to passengers in the
reduction of the time spent on the journey,
but against this you have to set the fatigue
and heat of the journey, impossible at some
periods of the year, the certainty almost that
women and children could not travel by
such a route, and the certainty that the
steamship companies would at once make,
as they could make, in my judgment, a
corresponding reduction both in time and
fares to meet the competition with which
they would be faced. Anyhow, I think
your Lordships will agree that in respect of
mails and passengers there is nothing on the
side of advantage which justifies us in accep
ting any risk or sacrifice of Imperial
security.
Then I pass to the interests of commerce.
If this railway were made, how would it
benefit Anglo-Indian trade ? The gross