'Koweit: A Report' [‎19v] (43/140)

22
The Sheikh considers Jehara as essential to Koweit, as being
the only locality with any agricultural capabilities or resource^
Besides being a valuable source of supply, of grain, forage, dates,'
etc., it is the favourite grazing ground,* in the winter months of
Bedouin tribes who acknowledge Mubarak’s rule. Even a tem
porary evacuation of this place would entail a great loss of pres
tige, and apart from permanent damage which might be done
to date trees, etc., the Bedouin tribes would certainly go over
to any enemy of Mubarak’s who occupied Jehara.
In short, the Sheikh is very far from regarding Jehara as a
mere dependency of Koweit; and expressed the strongest aver
sion to evacuating it, in order to withdraw his troops in time for
an effective defence of Koweit itself. He even maintained
that if Jel ara w-ere evacuated, even temporarily, Koweit itself
alone would be valueless to him. With some astuteness, he
pointed out that if Jehara were abandoned, it would implv
the occupation of Kathama also, the point supposed to be
selected for the terminus of the proposed German railway.
Fhis attitude of the Sheikh, as to the extreme importance
Jehara, was first clearly indicated at an interview at which I
was fortunate enough to be present. His view appears to
be not altogether unreasonable, and is one of considerable
importance in connection with the problem of the defence of
Kovveit territory, as a whole, and of the nature of the support
necessary to maintain its integrity.
theeve^ror^J’r^^f Sheikl ?’ Jehara wouId be untenable in
the event of a deliberate attack being delivered, bv a force in
possession of artillery, unless its defence was undertaken on a
N r o ge d r efe C nc e e t of an th a e PPe n rS P roba ^ e k under P r «<=nt circumstances.
Aahthi 1 inf» f I^n \ llla g e cou,d be satisfactory unless the Al-
thlse hethts t0t ' e norlh - west were occupied; as from
these heights there is entire command over Jehara at a rarn^e of
4 , 000 - 5 ,00° yards. Owing to the shoal nature of this head of
the b / y t’ 11 W0Ud be ' m P osslble for any fleet to effectivelyaid
Even flThTi.t cl”" 26 "'°, U,d " 0t be less than “yards
iery the effect of Te 6 f ^ ^ un P rovid < :d with artil-
“moral” at ^ r °- m s could hardly be more than
deserf country, 0 the^ttack^miffht bp 6 a » d ^vei
if from the south-west befkies fh ™, an y Action;
tions of Jehara with Kr, li tbreate U' n g the communica-
coming under naval fire aTail’. 116 attackln g force would avoid
Koweif^ucfif might ’ l ehara is , on the direct road, from Basrah to
to occupy and hold’ ““ ceivable circumstances, be advisable
danger would be tfit ai uffYT' But in this the
~ ~--l that an “"trained Arab garrison might pr obably
Jehata, and Mi. ShatHdlA^v'* t0 the “ Sne PdMurage grounds between Zobeir,