File 1166/1925 'Arabia: Nejd; negotiations with Ibn Saud regarding Iraq-Nejd question and Trans-Jordan boundary; Sir G Clayton's mission; Bahra agreement, 2nd November, 1925' [‎132r] (270/769)

17
11 th
ness
n'us,
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tier,
d as
ern-
was
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that
iejd.
the
r ged
Kaf
adi,
the
Jauf
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ated
and
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ther
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ay's
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Kaf,
was
hich
Government fixed this last point as that at which the eastern frontier
of I rans-Jordan should end, and that they could not consent to any
encroachment beyond the line which they had already proposed in
reg-ard to the southern portion of that section of the frontS.
With reg-ard to the northern frontier of Nejd I reminded Ibn Sa‘ud
Nnmh 6 A?K een ‘ Iraq and Nejd ’ as laid down Protocol
Number 2 to the Muhammara Convention, ended at the intersection
M ™r dla " 39 ° E - -‘h parallel 32» N„ a’nd informed him
Tr y a S ^° V ! rnme u nt ^ US \ insist that the frontier between Nejd
< d lians-Jordan should take off from that point and also could
parallel"^’ n ! 0 f ° ° W any IIne which Carried k to the north of
Ibn Sa‘ud took strong exception to the last statement, maintaining
that free access between Nejd and Syria was vital, and that he
r'rtiorus "f tH a PP rehenslon the existence astride those communi
cations of a strip of territory under the control of ‘Iraq and Trans
jordan. In reply I regretted that my instructions left me no discre
tion on this point.
Second Meeting.
The second meeting took place at 9 a.m. on Monday, the 12 th
October, with the same attendance as before.
Ibn Sa‘ud maintained that the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan had always been part
of his dominions and Kaf had been in the possession of his grand-
father. It was only at the instance of Sir Percy Cox that he had
refrained from occupying it. I suggested that any legitimate rights
might perhaps be safeguarded by some sort of saving clause in the
Agreement, but Ibn SaTid said he could not see what guarantees
would be of any value if he had to give it up, though he, on his side
was prepared to give such undertakings as might be considered
necessary. I suggested that possibly Ibn Sa‘ud did not so much
wish to occupy Kaf as to have the principle established that it lay
within his dominion, but he replied definitely that he wished to
occupy the place and that the mere recognition of his rights to Kaf
would be of no use if occupation were denied to him.
. 1 P oint ed out that the establishment by him of a strong force
m military occupation of a strategic point like Kaf must be viewed
W,t a § r * ve u^asmess by the Government of Trans-Jordan and re-
f, at l ded b y H ’ s Majesty’s Government as a menace to territory under
their Mandate. If one party is holding an important strategic
position, that party is either on the defensive or is definitely menac
ing his neighbour and an occupation by him of such a nature could
wu rega , r ?S aS m,1,tar y rath er than political or administrative
What I would like to ascertain was the real motive of His Highness
in wishing to occupy Kaf; was it merely because he wished to have
the place included within his territory, and in that case was he ore-
pared ^ ^ ave !t °P en for a11 Purposes; or \vas it his intention to
estabhsh there a strong military post, the reason for which could
only be either that he contemplated offensive action or that he was
himself afraid of being attacked.
Ibn Sa'ud admitted that his motive in wishing to occupy Kaf had
been to convert it into a stronghold, but if his occupation was likely
to be regarded as a menace he would be prepared to take su?h