File 1166/1925 'Arabia: Nejd; negotiations with Ibn Saud regarding Iraq-Nejd question and Trans-Jordan boundary; Sir G Clayton's mission; Bahra agreement, 2nd November, 1925' [‎137v] (281/769)

I bn Sa‘ud said he welcomed the suggestion. It was not obstina
on his part; he was simply anxious to arrive at some settlem ^
which would lead to peace. He would like to point out, howey 6 ^
that the door might be left open for ‘Iraq tribes to seek shelter
him and that tribes seeking refuge might not always be from N e '1
As he had said before, he knew his own tribes and was sure f
them, but there were a few individuals who might cause trouble ad
harm, and that was the reason he pressed the principle which h
thought should form the basis of any agreement. At the same ti ^
he welcomed my suggestion of preparing a draft agreement. lme ’
I replied that although the draft agreement might not, and inde d
would not, embody the principle to which His Highness attached ^
much importance, it would not be contrary to the interests which h°
had at heart. I begged him to reconsider an attitude which could
only prejudice the chances of a satisfactory agreement on all points
and which I was bound to tell him was, in my opinion, exceeding '
unreasonable. '
Ibn Sa‘ud hoped that his arguments would not be taken as evi
dence of obstinacy on his part. He had put forward the princinle
which we had discussed because he was convinced that any agree
ment which did not embody it would be unsuccessful in preventing
mischief, and he thought it his duty to p>oint this out to His Majesty’s
Government. He did not think that conditions in other countries
applied to Arab countries. Under the proposed agreement if an
Arab were to kill or transgress in some way, how were they to lay
hands on him? Nevertheless, he approved the suggestion of a draft
agreement, but he would ask that his view be embodied in the
preamble of such agreement.
I said I would, that afternoon or the next morning, prepare an
informal draft which I would have translated into Arabic for the
benefit of His Highness. In the present circumstances this appeared
to be the only way in which we could progress. Ibn Sa‘ud said
that the advantage of discussing everything was that it helped to
make the position clear. I agreed, and added that His Majesty’s
Government were most anxious that an agreement should be con
cluded which they were convinced would, given cordial co-operation
on both sides, tend to improve matters, not rapidly perhaps but at
least slowly and surely.
The meeting adjourned at 12 noon.
anemoon inn sa'ucl went to Mecca on the understanding
that he would spend there the whole of Friday and return to the
camp early on Saturday. At midday on the Saturday, however a
message came from him to the effect that important affairs of State
required his presence in Mecca until Sunday evening, but that, if I
pressed it, he would be prepared to return to the camp on Saturday
night. I replied asking His Highness to suit his convenience, and
m the interval I arranged for the draft agreement to be completed
and communicated to the Sultan’s advisers so that they might
examine it against his return. Ibn Sa’ud eventually returned at
nkrht 0 " Sunda y ai ? d 1 had an informal interview with him that
night. 1 he negotiations were resumed on the following morning.