File 3360/1916 Pt 3 'Persian correspondence. (1918-22)' [‎254v] (521/668)

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22. Telegram from the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to His Majesty’s
Vice-Consul, Ahwaz (Camp Ispahan) (repeated to Tehran and Ahwaz), No.
8807, aated the 16th October 1918.
23. Telegram from the Political Officer, Maidan-i-Napthem, to His
Majesty’s Vice-Consul, Ahwaz ; repeated to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, No. f
227, dated the 9th November 1918.
24. Telegram from His Majesty’s Vice-Consul, Ahwaz (Camp Ispahan), to
the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad (repeated Ahwaz), No. T.-22, dared the
12th November 19.8.
i
Enclo. No. 1 to Serial No. 152.
Memorandum dated Baghdad, the 23rd July 1918.
From—D r. M. Y. Young,
To—The Civil Commissiorer, Baghdad.
I understand that our present policy is to keep the Bakhtiaris oat of
interference with affairs in North Persia, and to maintain their authority in
their own country. To this end, I would recommend that we should continue
to give our active support to the present Illkhani and Illbegi. in view of existing
relations with the other Khans in the North. The Khans in Tehran can do little
without their followers, and the same applies to other towns where they may
be sent as Governors. 1 venture to suggest, therefore, that we should aim at
preventing any of the tribesmen from leaving their country, and this should
not be difficult for Illkhani and Illbegi to carry out provided they can hold
out to them sufficient inducements to stay where they are. In considering the
nature of our support to Illkhani and Illbegi at present, I am of opinion that
practical measures alone will count and I would submit the following for
consideration :—
1 Zafar’s offer to His Majesty’s Vice Consul, Ahwaz, to raise a force of
5,000 Cavalrv, should, I think, be accepted. I doubt very much if in the
present state of Bakhtiari tribes he will be able to collect that number, and we
should be satisfied if he raised half the proposed force and maintained it. But
at the present moment we should press him to raise as large a force as possible,
thereby reducing to a minimum the chances of support from levies amongst the
tribes, on which hostile Khans in Tehran and Ispahan count. Being the man
onthespot, he will have the choice in men, not only amongst his own followers,
hut also amongst those of other Khans.
2. In connection w ith paragraph 1 there may arise the question of arms
and also the question of money. As regards the first, I should not recommend
any further issue of rifles or ammunition for wTiich Zafar may ask, and on the
plea that it would transform his force into a British levy, I think that he may
desist from pressing his claim. He should use up all the rifles at present in
Bakhtiari country, and unless he expended much ammunition in recent Kuhgilu
expedition, I think that he should have enough at present to last him for
some time. The necessity for a supply of rounds may arise later, and it wall be
a matter for His Majesty’s Vice-Consul to recommend wdiether this should he
granted or not.
As regards money, I think that an annual subsidy should be considered,
either in conjunction with the Ts? 6,000 which we have already promised to pay
the Khans next autumn, or separately, hut I should deprecate any arrangement
for pay of individual sowars on the monthly basis, unless under our own and
direct supervision. This may mean a step further than we intend to go. My
own inclination would be to leave Zafar to make his own arrangements entirely
with respect to this force and wfith as little interference as possible on our side
at present. II is possible, of course, that the Khans may not ask for arms or
money now, but judging from experience I think it hardly likely that they
could maintain a force for any length of time without appealing to us for help.
3. I would recommend that the twm guns and personnel detailed for the
Kuhgilu expedition should accompany the Khans to Chahar Mahal, under care
ol His Majesty’s Vice-Consul, Ahwaz. I cannot help attaching the greatest