File 3360/1916 Pt 3 'Persian correspondence. (1918-22)' [‎318r] (648/668)

exists on tile sufference ol „he mob. Askabad is full of sturdy ruffians, armed
to the teeth, who ought of course to be at the front but refuse to go. The
Soviet has no power to make them do so. It decrees mobilization ; no one takes
any notice. The Soviet is divided into cliques, all puliing different ways. One/
of the chief dangers confronting them is due to the very heavy work put in by
pan-Islamic agents amongst the Turkomans and Caucasian Turks This they
simply dare not touch. They know that Ovaz Baiev, their Chief of Staff at the
front, is a traitor ; they have more than a suspicion that their Commander-in-
Chief, Oraz Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , is of the same way of thinking Both are Turkomans, strong
ly pro-Turk, and our officers have a profound distrust of them. But the Soviet !
dare not touch this question, for they are aware that the disorganised, and for
the most part worthless Russian community, is in no position to deal with the
Turkomans, though as a matter of fact there is a large party amongst the latter
not at all in sympathy with a pro-Turk programme. The Turkestan Union
party has come out into the open, and now takes a fairly large part in the
Government. But it does not seem to have a very numerous following as yet.
When the people as a whole begin to recover from the intoxicating fumes of
communism, by which they are still to a large degree bemuddled, they will
doubtless support the Union party to a greater extent than is now the case. In the
meanwhile the loafer and the ruffian largely control the situation. They do not,
w~ork, probably never did any. But there is this difference, that now an oblig
ing Soviet pays them for doing nothing—a species of open blackmail as the price
of remaining in nominal power. liven in the army ridiculous things take
place. The fee for taking up a box of ammunition in action is 20') roubles ;
for helping a wounded man to the rear 250 roubles. As for the value of the
Russian and Turkoman troops at the front our officers do not think much of
them. The only comforting reflection is that the troops of the Bolshevics seems
perhaps just one degree more worthless and incompetent.
14. The general situation .—There is no doubt that the recent favourable
turn in the war in Europe and elsewhere has had a good effect here. It is true
that the local Russian colony here, who throughbut have been obstructive and,
whilst ^doing nothing themselves, highly resent our interference in Turkestan
affairs, kindly hint that a good deal of our news is manufactured. It is true
that throughout Bclshevic Turkestan not a glimmer of outside events is ever
permitted to escape. But these things eventually filter through by word of
mouth, and that this is so is conclusively shown by the state of the local
markets and money rates. It is realised that we are winning, and that the
danger of a Turko-German regime is now remote. Many, doubtless, regret
this* but realise the truth all the same. But though the danger from out
side is largely lessened, if not wholly removed, there yet remain other
dangers. The complete reversal of everything which has taken place in the
last 18 months throughout Russian territory will take much time, and probab
ly considerable organised force to put right. There is still a strong pan-Islamic
danger to be considered ; still the forces of Bolshevism to be put down. To
what extent His Majesty’s Government consider they are concerned in these
matters I am of course unaware. But I would submit that we are to a large
extent pledged by the terms of the British Declaration to the Russian Peoples
not to abandon the task to which here, as elsewhere, we have put our hands
until we have succeeded in re-establishing order and a stable government. To
retire before we had accompanied this work would be regarded, I think, by all
those who have identified themselves with us as something very like a betrayal
There is, consequently, not a tittle anxiety to learn what our new attitude is
likely to be.
194:
(Received with Army Department Memorandum No. 13948, dated the 15th
October 1918.)
Telegram P., No. 301-20-G,, dated (and received) the 13th October 1918.
From—The Inspector-General, South Persia Rifles, Shiraz,
To—The Chief of the General Staff, Simla.
. (Repeated Tehran and Baghdad.)
The following is telegram, dated October 10th, from Intelligence Officer,
Ispahan.