Miscellaneous papers on the Near and Middle East [‎25r] (49/70)

their own forces arid those of the Allies or small states concerned
6. 20 turn to the actual application of the above. 2he
are the effect of
followin^/examples of potential decisions which must be considered;-
(a) Cession of Eastern i’hrace, including Adrianople,
to Greece.
(b) Internationalization of Constantinople.
(c) Withdrawal of Greeks from Aidin Vilayet.
(d) Withdrawal of Italians from Southern Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. .
(e) Creation of Armenian State.
(f) Penetration by Prench into the "Blue" zone in Cilicia
and the iirme ni an V i 1 ay e ts .
(g) Bstablishmont of independence of Georgia and
Azerbaijan.
7. taking the first of these, (a) 2he P r ench have a division
in reserve in i'hrace which, together with the six divisions
of Greek troops available on that front should be sufficient to
establish Greek adminietration as roouired. It should therefore
be sufficient if General pranchet d'Ks erey is informed before
hand of the area which the Greeks are to take over, so that he
can make his military arrangements bo fore the announcement is
mode.
(b) as regards Constantinople and the Straits the same
precaution will be necessary for General Milne to make his
preparations and for the ..ar Office to consider the necessity or
otherwise for the provision of reinforcements.
(c) and (d). As regards Smyrna and Adalia. If it is decided
that the Greeks and Italians, either or both, are to withdraw,
it will b.e a grave' mistake t,o make any premature announcement• 2his
question is necessarily interwoven with that of Armenia. Por
ii pressure is. suddenly taken off the furks in the Aidin or
^oma vil^ets, they will be free to turn on the Armenians,
i.oither Italians nor Ursofcs will probably relish having to remain