'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎9r] (17/136)

[This Doamsaatit is ike Propeity of His Britannic Majesty s Government.j
Printed for the Cabinet. March 1920.
SECRET.
MINARY SCHEME FOR THE MILITARY CONTROL OF
MESOPOTAMIA BY THE ROYAL AIR FORCE.
Memorandum with Covering Minute by the Chief of Air Staff.
Secretary of State,
WITH reference to your minute of the 29th February, and your statement in
Parliament on the possibility of the Royal Air Force taking over the military control
of Mesopotamia, the Air Staff have prepared the attached memorandum on the
power of the air to carry out work of this description, and submit an outline of the
scheme for assuming this responsibility.
With regard to the co-operation required from the Army, I have asked the
C.I.G.S. if he will prepare a statement showing the number of fighting troops that
will be required to carry out the role allotted to them; when this has been fully
discussed and decided at a conference of the two staffs, the War Office will be asked
to settle the nature and strength of the administrative services required for the
combined fighting forces, and to prepare an estimate for the cost involved.
An estimate of the cost involved by the enlargement of the Air Force to carry
out this scheme will be forwarded, together with the cost of the Army troops, as a
supplement to this paper, as soon as it is compiled.
I am anxious to point out that an early decision must be arrived at if the Air
Force is to assume responsibility for Mesopotamia by April, 1921. We have to put
forth considerable efforts to render ourselves self-contained as regards repairs to
aeroplanes and engines, necessitating considerable expansion of depots, &c., in that
country. The enlistment and training of personnel for work in Mesopotamia must
therefore be taken in hand at a very early date, and this will involve an increase in
the size of our establishments at Home. Further, in order to render ourselves really
inobile, we have to develop the design of the supply aeroplane for carrying stores
to isolated posts and the infantry-carrying aeroplane for the transportation of
considerable numbers of men.
I have forwarded this in order that you may be kept informed as to the lines
on which I am working. I would like to discuss it with you after you have read it.
H. TRENCHARD,
March 12, 1920.
Chief of Air Staff.
On the Power of the Air Force and the Application of this Power to Hold
and Police Mesopotamia.
1. Great as was the development of air power in the war on the western front,
it was mainly concerned with aerial action against enemy aircraft and co-operation
with other arms in actions in which land or sea forces were the predominating partner.
In more distant theatres, however, such as Palestine, Mesopotamia, and East Africa,
the war has proved that the air has capabilities of its own which can be usefully
employed in operations against the enemy’s ground forces, and this power has been
shown by aircraft whose design has not proceeded on the lines most suitable for
work of this nature. Incapable alone of defending a country against organised
external attack, the Air Force may yet impose considerable delay on an enemy whose
lines of advance are limited and lengthy, and has proved itself a powerful agent for
the attack and dispersal of considerable bodies of ground troops.
2. If this air power be applied for the purposes of keeping order in a partially
pacified area, the requirements of the garrison of such a country may be considered
from an entirely novel point of view. If ground troops are entrusted with this
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