'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎13r] (25/136)

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This document is the property oi His Britannic Majesty's Government.
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£
MINUTE BY THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.
Secretary of State.
I put up a short note on our military position in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia
and Persia. I may say at once that it is very unsatisfactory.
Owing to the continued delay in presenting a Peace Treaty to Turkey, owing to
the fact that when presented we are quite unable to enforce its terms, owing to the
series of disasters which the French have suffered at the hands of Turks and Arabs in
Cilicia—disasters which have obliged the French Government to reinforce that theatre
up to 48 battalions (reinforcements which are not sufficient to avoid still further
disasters), owing to our strained relations with Feisal and the very unsettled interior
condition of both Palestine and Egypt, my own opinion is that it is very much more
likely that we shall have to reinforce those theatres rather than weaken our garrisons.
Turning to Mesopotamia I find much the same condition of affairs.
Owing once more to our Turkish Treaty which, even at this date, contains no
frontier between Turkey and Armenia; owing to our very ill-defined relations to the
Kurds and Arabs ; owing to our Foreign Office commitments in Persia; owing to the
deplorable weakness in our own Administrative Services and the consequent depletion of
our fighting units to such an extent that many of them exist only on paper ; and
finally, owing to the steady advance of Bolshevism to the south and the fall of Denikin,
the Cossacks, the Caucasus and—I do not know what next—our position in
Mesopotamia is none too secure even with the garrison we now have in that theatre.
It is true that if we had plenty of aeroplanes and air personnel ; if our
Administrative Services were fully manned by a competent personnel; if we had large
numbers of armoured cars, tanks, mobile machine-gun units, all complete with trained
personnel; if we had wireless stations, railways and roads ; if we had well organized
gas units ; we could now and at once commence a progressive, even a rapid, reduction
of our garrisons. But what is the story of all these mechanical services? We have
struggled, and struggled hard, ever since the Armistice to fit out these services, and
you know as well as 1 do with what poor results.
The aeroplane programme is moving forward, but moving slowly; but the
armoured cars, the tanks, the wireless, the gas and the Administrative Services have
gone steadily back, with a deplorable result on the efficiency of the fighting units.
These are some of the reasons why, in our opinion, we cannot at present reduce
our garrisons in these theatres; and I trust you may think fit to lay these papers
before the Cabinet, in order that they may be under no illusion as to our military
position in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Persia.
Henry Wilson,
C.I.G.S.
§th May, 1920.
(B20/219) 100 5/20 II&S 8207wo