'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎43v] (86/136)

was able to carry, in the early part of the year, an average of 200 tons daily, with a
maximum of 3,000 tons over a period of 10 days. The remaining capacity ot t le
railway was occupied with civil freight, railway material, &c. The Inlanc <i er
Transport fleet had, therefore, to carry the balance (550 tons) daily from Basrah to
Kut, with a small special tonnage approximating to 30 tons* per dieny through to
Baghdad. The Inland Water Transport fleet was maintained at a carrying capacity
of 600 tons per diem, i.e., 50 tons reserve, with the promise of reduction when feasible
In June the railway situation was better, and the railway administration was able
to undertake to carry an additional 100 tons per diem. 1 be situation is not \yt,
however, such as to admit of the dispersion of the craft which had hitherto carried
these 100 tons. > ,
It was accordingly decided, so as to meet the wishes of the Army Council and at
the same time to guard the safety of His Majesty’s Forces, to offer on loan, with the
prospect of delivery, the craft to those civilian firms which had purchased them.
It may here be stated that the sale of the fleet took place on 1 6th June. By
1st July, 248 craft had been declared deliverable, and, in addition. 73 craft had
been prepared for overseas. More craft would have been delivered, but on the
examination of the terms of the sale it was found that the State would, by delivering,
suft’er a heavy financial loss. On 28th July, 1920, the declaration of any craft as
deliverable was stopped to enable the situation to be reviewed. Since that date ^5
craft have been re-taken up and four have been declared deliverable. As the situation
improves so will more craft be re-declared deliverable.
(ii.) Paragraph (i.) above gives the facts as they existed before the outbreak of
the present hostilities, and shows the practicable need for the retention of the Inland
Water Transport fleet up to 600 tons. ^ . • u r i a
At the outbreak of hostilities, however, reasons for the retention of the Inland
Water Transport fleet which, prior to that time, were theoretical, became paramount.
Two possibilities presented themselves :—
(a.) It might, through hostile action, be impossible to use the railway line
between Kut and Baghdad for a prolonged period, while that from Basrah
to Baghdad would, from the first, cease to be available as ;i through line.
{b.) The danger from heavy floods, such as during April, prevented the Kut line
from being used for a fortnight.
The first of these possibilities no longer belongs to the region of theory. I he
cutting of the Basrah—Baghdad line at 'once caused the tonnage which was being
carried by the Inland Water Transport fleet to be :aised to 1,000 tons a day, and
had not this fleet still existed with a carrying capacity of 60u tons a day, the demands
of the situation could not have been met.
I have no hesitation in stating that without the Inland Water 1 ransport fleet
it would have been impossible t>> maintain the army north of Baghdad. Moreover, the
dispersion of the fleet, in conjunction with the temporary or prolonged interference
with the railway communication, would have obliged any troops arriving at Basrah,
which might have been required to proceed to Baghdad, to march the whole distance.
I might add that, under the conditions above referred to, I should have had to rely on
civil water transport for the evacuation to the base of the sick and wounded.
(iii.) The statement that the monthly bill of the Inland Water I ransport is over
rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. 200,000 is perfectly correct. As a matter of fact it is over rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. 250,000.
As a set-off to the wages bill and the costs of running must be placed a total of
rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. 6,734,250, being the gross receipts on account of tonnage carried for the year.
An actual balance profit of rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. 96,000 is thus obtained on the working of the
Inland Water Transport for one year.
4. Lavish expenditure upon swollen administrative staffs.
(i.) The Quartermaster-General’s staff in Mesopotamia is in strength equivalent to
that of a command in England.
(ii.) The troops in a Command in England are accommodated in barracks with
stabling, &c., with municipal water supplies, electric light and modern conveniences.
They live “at home” under an old existing organization where all their wants are
catered for.
* Mote.—30 tons Basrah to B.i^lidad requires the same tonnage as 60 tons Basrah to Kut.