'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎57r] (113/136)

13. Relations with the Kingdom of the Hedjaz. —If' these arrangements are
carried out, the Colonial Office will become the authority responsible for the direction of
the Arabian policy of His Majesty’s Government, except in regard to the Kingdom of
the Hedjaz. On geographical grounds, there would be obvious advantages in an
arrangement by which negotiations with the Kingdom of the Hedjaz were entrusted to
the Department which is to be responsible for the territories surrounding it on three
sides. It is also clear that the new Department will be seriously hampered in its
dealings with Central Arabia if it is not in a position to exercise a direct influence over
the policy of His Majesty’s Government in regard to the Kingdom of the Hedjaz.
14. It may appear somewhat anomalous that negotiations with an independent
Kingdom should be entrusted to any Department other than the Foreign Office. It has
been suggested that the direct conduct of negotiations between the Government of
India and Afghanistan presents a somewhat similar arrangement to that indicated
above, but we understand it to be the view of the Foreign Office, that the case of'
Afghanistan does not offer an exact analogy with that of the Hedjaz.
Afghanistan is not in general diplomatic relations with Western Powers ; it is not
a member of the League of Nations; it has practically no means of access to the
outside world, and geographical reasons alone woul(] be sufficient to make the Viceroy
of India the channel of communication between His Majesty’s Government and the
Afghan Government. The Hedjaz, on the other hand, has only to ratify the Treaty of
Versailles to regularize its position as an original member of the League of Nations ; it
contains the holiest cities of Islam, to which large numbers of the Moslem subjects of
every power in the world make an annual pilgrimage ; it lies on the lied Sea, and- thus
has access by water to tlie outside world, and European Powers will continue to be
represented there in the future, its they have been in the past. We cannot deny that
there is considerable force in this argument. At the same time, we are impressed with
the paramount importance of the general direction and control of the Arabian policy of
His Majesty’s Government being vested in one Department of State, though we regard
any arrangement by which the representative of His Majesty’s Government in the
Hedjaz should communicate with any Department other than the Foreign Office as
unworkable.
15. We accordingly recommend that the channel of communication between
His Majesty’s Government and the Hedjaz Government should still be the Foreign
Office, but that in all questions affecting purely Arab politics the Colonial Office
should be regarded as the responsible British authority.
II.—SCOPE OF THE NEW DEPARTMENT.
1G. W T e have thought it necessary to discuss at some length the definition of the
territorial sphere for which the new Department should be responsible, since it was
clearly impossible for us to make effective recommendations while it remained uncertain
what areas were under consideration. For the same reason we think it necessary to
have some working definition of the scope of the new Department before proceeding to
discuss in detail the steps to be taken with regard to its formation. If our interpretation
of the intentions of the Cabinet in regard to the territorial sphere of the new Department
is accepted, the Colonial Office will become the responsible British authority on all
matters relating to :—
{a.) Administration and policy in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Aden.
(b.) Policy in other Arab areas within the British sphere of influence.
(c.) The delimitation of boundaries between British spheres and the territories of
independent Arab rulers.
(d.) All expenditure, whether civil or military, which may fall upon Imperial funds
as a result of British responsibility for and interest in the areas concerned.
17. Some of the problems arising out of this definition have been dealt with in
the recommendations which we have already made. As regards (d), we have not
considered the question of financial adjustments with the Government of India. Nor
have we examined the larger question of the incidence of expenditure in respect of the
Mandated territories.
There remain three questions of major importance :—
(1.) The arrangements to be made for carrying out British military policy in the
Middle East, and the relations between the Colonial Office, and the War
Office and Air Ministry.