'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎65v] (130/136)

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2. I quite understand your difficulties, and you in your turn ought to try to
realise the difficulties which exist at home and face the inexorable facts. # l'or instance,
we have spent over 30 , 000 , 000 Z. on military expenditure in Mesopotamia in
We are probably committed to a further 25,000,000/. in 1921-22 You now propose
for several rears after 1921-22 a garrison of one division, one brigade, ot
communication troops, which, with the Air Force, would not cost less than 1^000,000/.
or l4,000,0002. a year. 1 do not think there is the slightest chance ol the Cabinet or
Parliament agreeing to expenditure on such a scale for a country which we only hold
under the League of Nations and are pledged to return to the Arabs at the earliest
possible moment. The maintenance of the British Navy itself may well turn upon
ih e expenditure of 12,000,0002. or 14,000,0002. a year on new construction, l ie
Chancellor of the Exchequer does not know which way to turn foi money, and the
whole country is furious at the present rate of expenditure, no part of which is more
assailed than money spent in Mesopotamia.
3. I have undertaken very reluctantly to face this storm and difficulty in the
hope that all British work and sacrifice in Mesopotamia may not be cast away, and
1 have a right to loyal aid and support from the men on the spot. I am not
committed to any particular alternative method of providing the force necessary
to sustain the Arab Government, but 1 am determined that every avenue shall be
promptly and thoroughly explored. For this reason I have set up without a day s
delay the Committees which are necessary.
4. Why should you assume that ordinary regular troops organised in divisions
and brigades, with their lavish and ponderous staffs, are the only form in which
the requisite element of force can be supplied ? Surely it is worth while considering
whether a smaller number of men of much higher individual quality would not be
just as effective and less costlv to maintain. Again, Ah Maishal Jienchaid, who
has great experience not only of the air, but of the Mohammedan population of
Wesf Africa, has elaborated in full detail a scheme for maintaining control once
peace and order have been re-established. Thirdly, there is the question of whether
the Indian troops who will be required in support of the Arab Government cannot be
better raised specially for Mesopotamian service, and whether a higher efficiency and
more British officers and approportion of British non-commissioned officers per unit
would- not enable the same work to be done by fewer men with a consequent
diminution in the difficulties of supply.
5. If all alternative methods fail and we have to choose between an indefinite
recurring charge of 12,000,0002. or 14,000,0002. a year or retirement to Basra and
the immediate coastal zone. I have no doubt whatever that the retirement will be
ordered. You would take a great responsibility if, before any such decision has
been taken, you deprived His Majesty’s Government of your local knowledge and
influence, and thus diminished gravely the chances of a satisfactory solution.
Answered bn No. 13.
11 F rom High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, 2Mh January 1921. 1049
(Received 11.15 a.m.)
Clear the line.
258 S. Personal and secret. Your telegram of the 15th January. 344. I have
delayed replying in the hope that some of the parties concerned would show their
hand, or ventilate their opinion. During the month which has passed since I made
suggestions regarding Faisal, situation lias developed on the following lines :—
Firstly, Saiyid Talib has specifically conveyed to me through Ids British Adviser,
that he has definitely abandoned intention of becoming the candidate for Amirate of
Mesopotamia, and proposes to cease propaganding for that purpose.
On receipt of above intimation, I had no doubt that there was something behind
it, and have since found following explanation.
The Naqib when he first took office at my urgent instance disclaimed all
ambition to compete for Sultanate. Since then he has never again referred to the
subject, except to express the opinion that Shereef’s family have no right to look in
the direction of Irak. I have lately learnt, however, from a confidential employee of
his, that he does now wish to be a candidate in the interests of his children. It
appears that he recently broached the subject to Saiyid Talib and asked latter to