'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎66v] (132/136)

13
From High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, '2\)th Jauuarij I'Ll.
(Received -8tb, 1- noon.)
J
>0 dated
973 s Personal and Secret. Your personal and secret telegram No. 00
22nd J armary. Your telegram No. J defined the policy of the Cabinet precisely ior
my guidance, and wording of it as received by me appeared to convey clearly t.iat
though they had accepted mandate, it was fixed intention of His Majesty s Government
to evacuate Mosul as soon after the 1st April as Gen. Ironside s rearguard reached
Khanikin. My acceptance of this course was assumed in spite of my telegiams
104 and 119 S., which had fully explained impossibility of such withdrawal consistently
with acceptation of mandate. Such a decision left me, and would leave me no
alternative but immediate resignation, with the fullest sense of responsibility.
The method by which you contemplated carrying out the policy above was one
which might, or might not, prove feasible after examination, but in any case could not
possibly have taken shape in time to replace troops before their proposed withdrawal
in the spring or early summer.
The proposal to which 1 referred as having been rejected as a whole, was not
primarily the introduction of Faisal, but the reduction of the mandatory troops to one
division and one brigade after one year to which the proposal of the introduction of
Faisal was to be an accompaniment. With the above explanation I may say that 1 fully
appreciate the very difficult position in which the Cabinet is placed, in matter of
expenditure, and I am entirely with you as to absolute necessity ol cutting it, down,
and ready to co-operate in exploring every avenue for so doing, promptly and
thoroughly, provided that, during the process of investigation or experiment no
premature action in the direction of withdrawal or reduction below the safe minimum
is taken.—Cox.
Answered bn No. 17.
14 From Seeretarg of State to General Haldane, 26/h January I OlH.
Please comment on the following:—“In the event of Cabinet deciding upon
evacuation of Mesopotamia and withdrawal to immediate vicinity of Basrah town,
bulk of our troops to remain in the country till hot weather is over. All preparations
to be made meanwhile for the swiftest possible evacuation after that period. Stores,
munitions, Ac., to be sent out of the country continually, meanwhile. No detach
ments to be allowed beyond railheads, which would compromise the speed of the
general withdrawal once it has begun. On this basis, what would be the maximum
rate of withdrawal if it began in September ? What are the limiting factors which
prevent your moving the troops thus cleared of stores, refugees, Ac., out of the
country in three months, so that by 31st December we shall be responsible for
nothing outside Basrah town? 1 do not at all understand why you should find any
difficulty in executing this operation provided your communications are clear and
your troops are all on rail and river communications by 21st September. To move
90,000 men along a railway and two rivers in three months is surely a very moderate
demand, /.<?., only 1,000 men a day. You should assume that the port of Basrah will
be kept fully supplied with shipping, so that all echelons can be embarked as soon as
they arrive. Do not concern yourself with the shipping problem at all, nor with any
other consideration than the purely military operation.”
15 From Secretary of State to General Haldane, 2Sth January 1921.
Clear the line.
Personal and Secret. Quartermaster-General states we were feeding on
1st December 1920, in Mesopotamia and Persia:—
British, 19,300; natives, 80,117; native followers, 10,400; •native labourers,
23,740; local labourers, 13,501 ; civilians, 3,310; refugees, 33,351. Total personnel,
225,785. Animals (principally donkeys), 53,198.
This is no doubt one of the reasons why we are being driven out of the province
by the expense. Let me have as soon as possilfie your own anticipated programme