'Report on the Persian Army' [‎13r] (25/170)

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Robert, was made “ Master General against the Turks, ’ and
upon his return to Persia in 1(312 lie brought with him from
England Captain Thomas Powel, of Hertford, who became
colonel of 700 horse under the Persian. It is interesting to
read of English officers holding positions of trust in the service
of the Shah at this early date and to know that English
counsels were responsible for the earliest modern reform in
the military organisation of Persia. Nevertheless, through
this and the succeeding century the Persian army retained
for the most part its original and almost immemorial organi
sation as a loose collection of irregular cavalry contingents.
Even under Shah Abbas, when the army was at its best,
there prevailed the most complete ignorance of scientific
warfare, and battles were little else than desultory cavalry
engagements on a large scale. In the campaign against
Ormuz, which the Persians waged in conjunction with the
English in 1(322 against the Portuguese, the English were
amazed at the ignorance and backwardness of their allies, and
Edward Monoxe, the agent of the East India Company at
Ormuz, wrote, “ The Persians are ignorant of the art of warre,
for they entered without feare or wit, and lost with shame
what they might have maintayned with honour. Other defects
I observed in the very sinewes of warre, such that I cannot but
wonder that one of the wonders of our age, Sha Abbas, should
send over an Armie so weakly provided with money, armes,
munition, ships and all necessary furniture.” (“ Purchas’
Pilgrims,” II, lib. X, cap. 9.) Pietro della Valle, who was in
Persia at this time, speaks of the newly enrolled infantry as
fusiliers who owed their origin to Sir Anthony Sherley, were
recruited from the lower orders of the country, and received
their pay quarterly from the Shah. He describes them as a
very useful body, 20.000 strong, and adds that they were in
the beginning on foot, but were afterwards mounted and
armed with matchlocks and a fork to fire from. He estimated
the total strength of the army of Shah Abbas at 97,000 cavalry,
while Herbert states that the Shah could march 300,000 horse
and 70,000 foot, but could seldom readily advance more than
50,000 men, “ enough to find forage or provant in such barren
country.” Chardin, who was in Persia from 1(365 to 1677,
mentions that at the death of Shah Abbas the effective
strength of the army was 120,000—royal troops 50,000,
provincial troops 70,000. So rapid, however, was the decline
in military strength and efficiency under the nerveless rule of
the successors of Abbas the Great, that Chardin, who was
present at a review held before Shah Abbas II in 16(36, saw the
same troops passing and repassing from ten to twelve times,
and a Persian remarked to him, “ We have a good army for
reviews, but a bad one for war.” How bad a one did not fully
appear till the Afghan invasion about half a century later,
when the flower of the Persian army, over 50,000 strong,
allowed itself to be worsted in the great battle at Gulnabad,
near Isfahan, on the 3rd of March, 1722, and Isfahan was