'Report on the Persian Army' [‎14v] (28/170)

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them, and besides massacring 12,000 Arabs who had gone over
to the Turks on the 19th July. In the following year on the
12th June, at Erivan, he again signally defeated the Turks and
caused them a loss of 50,000 men, his oavh death-roll being
8,000. Nadir Shah’s organisation, however, had not had time
to take proper root, and immediately after his assassination in
1747 his troops dispersed in bands all over the country, robbing
and plundering wherever they went and offering their services
to the various competitors for the throne who now appeared.
Under these competitors and even under the Zends, who were
ousted by the Kajars, the military condition of Persia was not
ameliorated ; discipline degenerated more and more; battles
were merely engagements between bodies of irregular cavalry
in which rarely more than a hundred men were killed. Of the
army under the Zends we obtain some infoimation from the
works of George Forster and Comte Ferrieres Sauvebceuf.
The former, who wrote in 1783, says :—
“ TIie Afghan army is to-day much superior to that of the Persians ; these
latter, deprived for a long time of a regular government, and submitted one
time to a foreign yoke, and at another to the uncertain and temporary
authority of some miserable party chief, have lost their patriotism and all
spuit of enterprise. . They know very little of firearms, and the successes
which they have obtained were principally due to the impetuosity of their
cavalry. The matchlock is the ordinary arm of the Persian infantry, with
the exception of some troops of Azerbaijan, Shirvan, and Daghistan, where
they took the use of flintlocks from the Turks, but the little esteem which
they have for this arm will, no doubt, prevent its being adopted for a long
b emciea Stiuvcbocuf, who wrote n yetir or two litter cind
was a French officer, says :—
The Persians have not reduced the custom which they have of destrov-
mg themselves into an art. They camp irregularly, without, however,
pitching their tents too far away from each other. They absolutely ignore
the means of fortifying their towns, considering that a simple wall constructed
of sun-dried bricks and flanked by mud towers form a sufficient protection.
I he artillery, which they do not know how to use, is more an object of show
with them than one of destruction. Their sieges are merely blockades, but
they observe a certain order on the march and in combat. The infantry
oims m large bodies, and although not in lines, always keeps close to its
colours ; the cavalry with the commander at the head forms up behind, and
thus _ saw Ah Murad Khan Zend march his 60,000 men against Agha
Muhammad khan Kajar. In front, on an elephant, were carried two
enormous gongs and several trumpets for directing the march of the army
ihere were also many camels carrying small f pounder cannon, which were
discharged when the animal was on its knees. The cavalry is excellent, and
its horses are accustomed to climb hills, well support the cold, and can even
in inter with deep snow on the ground make long marches. The infantry
bears great fatigue The-frugality of the Persians makes the provision of
a easy , r k ; ,r T 1 ’ a litt,e cheese > perhaps some dried fruit or
a little nee and less meat, composing theia food. They have very little
Snip?’ 4 ’ Cdmed ° U nmJe8 ’ and one never sees any useless article fn their
baking into consideration the ever-growing degeneration of
discipline and the total want of military knowledge and
inclinations shown by the rulers of Persia, it may be slid that
the vai with Russia at the beginning of this century had not