'Report on the Persian Army' [‎22v] (44/170)

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our officers, while in reality their object was to destroy it. The change w;is
fatal to Persia in all respects. The English for a time imagined they were
working for their own interests, but they really worked for those of Russia.
They had made a treaty with Path Ali Shah, by which they had agreed to
give him a subsidy of £200,0(X) on condition of his maintaining a corps of
12,000 regular infantry and 25 pieces of cannon. In spite of this assistance
the army commanded by Abbas Mirza was continually beaten on the Araxes,
Georgia was conquered by Russia, and, later, the Treaty of Turkmanchai was
the only means of stopping the conquerors within six days march from the
capital. The English instructors had meanwhile remained about twenty
years in Persia with enormous salaries.”
It may here, however, be asked whether Persia really had
gained in military strength by the institution of a regular army
on the European plan and by the employment of European
officers, armament, ammunition, discipline, and skill. All
competent authorities say “ No.’’ The French and English
officers found the men docile and intelligent, but the Persian
officers were described by them as the greatest rascals in the
world. Led by such superiors, a Persian force brought face to
tace with European troops was apt to take sauve <jui pent as the
general order. But it was in its effect upon the military spirit
and resources of the country as a whole that the disastrous
consequences of the change were most seriously felt. Prior to
the reign of Path Ali Shah, the military strength of Persia had
consisted in its inexhaustible supplies of light horsemen,
furnished by the tribal chieftains, who, on the feudal basis of a
military contribution, preserved a nominal independence.
Each of these great khans, or Ilkhanis, lived in state and in
comparative isolation from the central authority, among his
own clansmen, keeping large studs of the finest breeds of
Persian, Turkoman, and Arabian horses, and encouraging the
spirit of horsemanship and patriotism among his followers.
I his system was absolutely broken down bv the policy, or
fears, of Path Ali Shah, who set himself to 'disintegrate the
authority of these feudal barons, and, shearing the locks of the
Persian Samson, found, when it was too late, that he had
sacrificed his strength. Colonel Stuart (“Journal of a Resi
dence, p. 21b) relates that General Yermoloff, formerly com
mander-in-chief in Georgia, could not conceal his joy when
he was told that Abbas Mirza had begun to form a. regular
army, saying that he should now be able to get at the
1 eisians, which he never could do before. This opinion
Colonel Stuart heard fully confirmed by Count Woronzow at
Odessa:—
e “ T h Cou]lt related several particulars which occurred in the campaigns
ol 1802 3 against Persia. . . . At that time there were no serbaz, but the
irregular horse were so active and intelligent that the Russians were constantl v
harassed at all points. They could not stir from their camp, and one
morning whilst beleaguering Erivan they suddenly found themse’ves
surrounded by bath Ah Shall and all his forces. The only wish then feb
by the Russian officers was that the Persians would endeavour (as they since
have under our auspices) to organise a ‘ Nizam,’ become tangible, and abandon
their Parthian tactics ! ”
Not less emphatic was Sir John Malcolm, who saw clearly