Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎37r] (73/348)

[This Docnment is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
EASTERN. [October 30.j
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[147559] No. 1.
Earl (Jurzon to Viscount Grey.
(No. 681.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, October 30, 1919.
THE United States Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, in order to make
representations with regard to a case in which his Government took a keen interest,
and concerning which they had received a reply from the Eastern Department of the
Foreign Office that did not altogether satisfy them.
The case arose out of the claim of certain American geologists (as they were
called by the Ambassador) representing the Standard Oil Company, who, being in
possession of a concession from the Turkish Government for the exploitation of certain
oil-producing areas in Palestine, had gone to Jerusalem with a view of inspecting
their properties, but who had been denied by the British authorities any opportunity
of carrying out their task. The defence, had been made by the Foreign Office that,
pending the grant of a mandate, all such proceedings had been impartially vetoed by
His Majesty’s Government, who felt that they had no right to anticipate a decision
which might compromise the ultimate mandatory, whoever that might be ; and which,
further, might be a source of trouble in the country itself while it remained under a
military administration.
The Ambassador read to me a long and rather argumentative statement from his
Government, which did not seem to carry much conviction to his own mind, but which,
he apparently felt, compelled him to reopen the case. He argued as though it would
be safe to proceed upon the hypothesis that the mandate, if not already given, would
presently be given to Great Britain.
To this I replied that, so far as my recollection extended, though there had been a
certain classification of different forms of mandate drawn tip by Lord Milner’s
Commission in Paris, the French had hitherto refused to agree to the grant of any
particular form of mandate with regard to any part of the Turkish dominions.
Mr. Davis then sought to establish a distinction between investigation and
operation. He contended that it might be possible to allow a concessionaire at least
to investigate upon the spot the nature of the concession which he had obtained,
without taking any practical steps to carry it into effect.
I said that, though this was a logical, I did not think that, in practice, it would be
a very helpful distinction. A permission given in one case would have to be given in
others ; there were doubtless scores of concessionaires wffio held, in differing degrees,
concessions from the Turkish Government—with whom, I reminded him, Great Britain
was still at war—^nd I could not imagine anything more unfortunate than to have
Palestine overrun by groups of persons of different nationalities, endeavouring to
ascertain what their concessions—the legal status of which had not yet been deter
mined—were likely to be worth. I promised, however, to look into the matter myself,
and to let him have a reply.
I then took advantage of the presence of Mr. Davis to tell him, not in the form of
an officiar protest, but as a fact of which I thought that in fairness I ought to make
him aware, that I had good reason to believe that the United States High Commissioner
in Constantinople, Admiral Bristol, was inspired by no very friendly feelings towards
Great Britain, and was continually suspecting, and sometimes openly accusing, us of
dark and sinister intrigues for which there was not a vestige of foundation. Not only
had we evidence that Admiral Bristol had openly spoken to this effect in recent discus
sions in Smyrna, but I had an abundance of testimony from independent quarters that
his whole action was characterised by a similar suspicion. This, I said, seemed to me
to be a very unjustifiable attitude for the Admiral to adopt. Amongst the various parties
who were figuring upon the international stage in Constantinople and Asia Minor, there
was, 1 said, none less anxious to get any individual advantage out of the situation or more
sincerely desirous to be quit of responsibility than the British. Our evacuation of the
Caucasus ; our retirement from Trebizond and Samsun; our reluctance to let our
forces play any compromising part in Asia Minor; our well-known intention not to
take a mandate for any of those regions; and the sincerity and consistency with which
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