Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎85v] (170/348)

who could define to me their nature, and I doubted very much whether Count k ;ioiz<i
himself would hud it easy to demonstrate their existence.
I liad, however, received information within the last twenty-tour hours which
siiowed me very clearly what was the view taken of these innocent commeiciai
relations at Kabul. I had seen a telegram from Afghanistan which categorically
stated that the Government of Italy were prepared to sell arms and implements of
every kind to the Afghan Government. If this were true, as 1 could hardly believe
it to be, was it the kind of arrangement that Count Sforza, in his desire for a closer
alliance with ourselves, thought himself at liberty to make ( Hearing that the
same Afghan mission had gone from Home to Paris, 1 had taken the trouble to
enquire what view the French Government took of it, and whether any similar
action was contemplated there. I had only this afternoon received the reply that
M. Briand would not dream of doing anything of the sort. It was obvious, therefore,
that the views of Paris coincided very closely with those which I had ventured to
express.
But I went on to say that my case was not confined to that of Angora and
Afghanistan alone. Every Foreign Office in the world, the Italian, no doubt, not less
than our own, had the means of securing information as to what was going on in
most parts of the world. It could not be by a mere coincidence, nor could it be due
to some great mistake, that from a dozen different quarters, not merely in the East,
but in Europe, information reached me that Count Sforza was pursuing a policy
quite independent of British interests, and sometimes sharply opposed to them. It
was not possible or desirable for me to specify cases, but when 1 was aware of the
fact that the Italian Foreign Minister would sometimes give simultaneous assur
ances of his support to ourselves on the one hand, and to other parties, with whom
we were in disagreement, on the other, I could not feel very confident that a single
or uniform policy was being pursued. I had not met with a similar experience in
any other quarter, and the impression left upon my mind had deepened and
strengthened with every month that passed. I felt sure that, until there was an
open and permanent departure from this line of action it was useless to pursue the
larger line of discussion which the Ambassador had recommended.
Signor de Martino, who had listened to my statement without protest, and, I
think, also without much surprise, cordially agreed that it was impossible feven to
contemplate the discussion which his chief desired unless the ground was cleared
by the removal of all the obstacles which the independent attitude of his Government
had created. The remarkable thing was that at no point did he attempt any
defence. This may perhaps be explained by the somewhat delicate relations that
are believed to subsist between Count Sforza and himself, and which would perhaps
render it not altogether disagreeable to one to see the other put into an unpleasant
corner.
Indeed, the Ambassador went on to explain that he thought the case which 1
had presented had better be made to Count Sforza by yourself rather than by him.
This, l suggested, was a somewhat unusual form of procedure, and I had every
confidence that he would adopt the more normal method of reporting to his Govern
ment the case which 1 had thought it my duty to make. If he was at all afraid that
his presentation of the case would be open to suspicion, I would consider the
propriety of giving instructions to Vou to support his representations.
Signor de Martino, changing the subject, then sought information from me as
to what was in contemplation as regards the possible modification or cancellation of
the Tripartite Agreement with Turkey. His Government were very much alarmed
at the suggestion that this might be proposed. It represented their sole spoils of
war, and public opinion in Italy would never allow of this modification.
I felt bound, not for the first time, to contest his Excellency’s reading of history.
In Europe, I pointed out that none of the victorious iUHes had gained more out of
the victory than Italy; while in Asia, where they had not, so far as I could
remember, made any sacrifices, or even lost a man, and where their case for compensa
tion arose solely out of a somewhat vague phrase in the Treaty of London, they
appeared to claim as a right compensation, for which it was very difficult to find
justification.
I told the Ambassador exactly what had happened at Paris. When I was
discussing with M. Briand the concessions that it might be necessary to make to the
Kemalist Party, in the event of negotiations being reopened with them, M. Briand
had himself taken the initiative in remarking that, in his judgment, the Turks would
be found to be just as sensitive about the infringement of their sovereignty involved