Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎97v] (194/348)

Article 3. This provision for the withdrawal of French troops irom the
territory handed over to Turkey ignores French obligations under article 8 of the
Tripartite Agreement of the lOth August, 1920, to maintain troops in the zone ot
special French interests until the French, British and Italian Governments are
agreed in considering that the Treaty of Peace with Turkey is being executed, and
that the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of Christian minorities
have been put into force and their execution effectively guaranteed. While the
evacuation of Cilicia, which, as M. Briand stated, was the object of the negotiations,
necessarily involved the withdrawal of French troops, it was clearly incumbent on
the French Government to take all possible guarantees for the protection of
minorities in accordance with their obligations.
But while the full amnesty provided in article 5 may offer some protection for
the minorities in Cilicia, the agreement appears to contain no safeguards for its
effective operation by the Kemalists.
Further, while article 6 provides that “ the Government of the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey declares that the rights of minorities solemnly recognised in
the National Pact will be confirmed by them on the same basis as that established
by the conversations concluded on this subject between the Powers of the Entente,
their enemies and certain of their Allies,’' it is noted that the clause is not drafted
to apply to Cilicia and is therefore presumably of general application to Turkey.
It is thus open to the objection that it runs counter to the provisions of the
Treaty of Sevres for the protection of minorities, and ignores the responsibilities
assumed by the French Government for the protection of minorities in the zone of
their special interests under the Tripartite Agreement. Article 1 of that agreement
states that the “ assistance ’’ to be afforded to the Turkish Government by France
“ shall be specially directed towards enhancing the protection afforded to racial,
religious or linguistic minorities.” It appears, therefore, that by this article France
has not only renounced her responsibilities with regard to the protection of minorities
under the Tripartite Agreement, but has pledged herself to substitute for the
minority provisions in the Treaty of Sevres other provisions on the lines of the
treaties made between the principal Allies and such European countries as Poland.
It need hardly be pointed out that these treaties are inadequate and their provisions
generally quite inapplicable to Turkey. In fact, the contention of the Angora
Government on one important point of general application to Turkey has been
accepted by one Ally in advance of general negotiations for a treaty of peace between
all the Allies and Turkey.
Article 7. It is assumed that this article, which provides for special rights of
Turks in the Alexandretta area and for the use of Turkish as the official language,
will necessitate some modification of, or addition to, the draft mandate for Syria
now before the League of Nations.
Article 8 . The revision, provided for in this article, of the northern frontier of
Syria as laid down in the Treaty of Sevres cannot be regarded as the concern of
France alone. It hands back to Turkey a large and fertile extent of territory which
had been conquered from her by British forces and which constituted a common gage
of Allied victory, although by an arrangement between the Allies the mandate had
been awarded to France. The mandate is now under consideration by the League of
Nations and this important and far-reaching modification of the territory to which
it applies altogether ignores the League of Nations, while the return to Turkey of
territory handed over to the x\llies in common without previous notification to Great
Britain and Italy is inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter of the treaty
which all three have signed.
Further, the revision provides for handing back to Turkey the localities of
Nisibin and Jeziret-ibn-Omar, both of which are of great strategic importance in
relation to Mosul and Mesopotamia; the same consideration applies to the handing-
back to Turkey of the track of the Bagdad Railway between Tchoban-Bey and
Nisibin. In neither case have His Majesty's Government been consulted.
•It is noted that the frontier is to be'“ fixed ” by the two parties within one
month of the signature of the agreement in advance of all the other frontiers of
Turkey under the Treaty of Sevres.
Article 11. Inasmuch as this concession may be followed by demands from
Turkey for similar privileges in regard to other sites, the Allies'were entitled to
expect that they should have been consulted before any such arrangement was made.
Article 10 . The transfer of the Bozanti-Nisibin section of the Bagdad line to
a French group seems to be tantamount to the execution by France of paragraph 2