Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎100r] (199/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
t — I j e
No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.
EASTERN (Turkey).
•
[November 19.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
[E 12735/1/44]
No. 1 .
Minutes of an interview between Lord Curzon and MM. Noradunghian, Aharonian,
General Bagratouni and Mr. Malcolm, held in Lord Curzon's Room at 12-30 p.m.,
November 19, 1921.
M. AHARONIAN expressed gratitude for the attitude of His Majesty’s Govern-
nient in regard to Cilicia, which he regarded as an indispensable lever for obtaining
from Turkey a solution that took proper account of the Armenian position and claim.
Kars and Ardahan had already been handed over to Turkey. If Cilicia were now
similarly abandoned it would be a fresh catastrophe, which would involve the
throwing away oi all means of getting any terms for Armenia. The situation of
Russia was such that she soon might be forced out of the Caucasus and the Turks
would then walk in and massacre. The Eastern question must be settled before such
a possibility materialised. For this purpose Cilicia should be used to make the Turks
tullil their obligations, and not returned to them before the Eastern question—and
especially the Armenian question—was settled.
Lord Curzon replied that the Armenian delegation should say that at Paris
rather than in London.
M. Aharonian said that he had seen MM. Briand and Franklin-Bouillon. The
latter recognised the relation between Cilicia and the Armenian question as a whole.
In reality Cilicia concerned all the Allies. All that M. Franklin-Bouillon could or
would say was that Mustapha Kemal was an honest man who would do no harm.
No real guarantee of any kind was offered to the Armenians for their safety; could
not something be done by the other Allies to postpone evacuation by the French ?
. 1 /. N oradunghian pointed out that the minority provisions in the Franklin-
Bouillon Agreement were wholly inadequate. The French could only say that there
would be French consuls at various points in these regions. This was obviously no
safeguard. The Franklin-Bouillon Agreement was disastrous in that, apart from
the special Armenian interests, it raised the prestige of Mustapha Kemal and lowered
that of the Allies. Surely, if the Treaty of Sevres were modified it must be done by
all the Powers, and not by one. At present he feared that the last remnants of the
Armenians were doomed. Could not Great Britain propose a special mission which
should enquire on the spot as to the real wishes of the population, which was a mixed
one? Any such enquiry would reveal a vast anti-Kemalist majority. If France
maintained that the protection of the region was a question of money, could not the
Allies see their way to assist ? It was to be anticipated that America would be
willing to contribute. He asked whether Lord Curzon would advise the Armenian
representatives to send a telegram to the local population urging them not to flee,
at least for the time being.
Lord Curzon replied that the Franklin Bouillon Agreement had been made
without British knowledge. We had regretted it and were now in correspondence
with the French Government. The French reply must be examined. As the
Armenians knew, he had always taken an interest in the Armenians and had done
his best for them. The French reply, especially in so far as it concerned the protection
of the Christian population, would be very closely scrutinised. He agreed that the
Treaty of iSevres could not be replaced otherwise than by common consent of the
Allies. There would soon be another Supreme Council for remodelling the Treaty
of Sevres, and the Armenian case would then be heard. They would recollect that
stipulations had been made in Armenia’s favour at the time of the abortive negotia
tions with Bekir Sami Bey earlier in the year. As to the despatch of a commission,
he could not pronounce definitely. The French were retiring hurriedly and the
proposal presented obvious difficulties. He would examine the French reply as soon
as possible, and the Armenian delegation must trust him to do his best for them.
He warned them, however, that the matter was much more difficult now than last
year. Nevertheless, be would consider the suggestion submitted.