Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎104r] (207/348)

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reduction in that which, in the particular circumstances of our Empire, was our main,
and indeed almost our sole, weapon of defence. Meanwhile, it was a matter of common
knowledge that our army had been reduced to a point where it could not be regarded
as a menace by anyone, and was hardly sufficient for the defence in times of peace of
the Empire. In these circumstances it was a matter of most vital consideration to us if
we found that, while we had rendered ourselves relatively powerless in both these
respects, we were nevertheless expected to contemplate a situation in which the
continent of Europe would remain a great armed camp—and I was not alluding to
the armies of France only, but to those of Italy, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and
possibly, if the French argument were sound, of Germany also—and in which, further,
no limitation was to be placed either upon the construction of submarines, on the
nominal plea that they were wanted for purposes of coastal defence, or of air machines,
which had developed into one of the most powerful instruments of offensive warfare.
I said therefore that the question of all these instruments of war and their multiplication
was a matter of profound concern to us, and their relation to the naval aspect of the
case was one which no Englishman could afford to ignore.
His Excellency thanked me for my explanation on these points, which he did not
officially dispute, and as to which he repeated that the apprehensions which had
prevailed in his own countn 7 arose from imperfect or condensed reports.
Reverting again to the situation in the Near East, I said that without desiring to
repeat what I had said in my two notes about the Angora Agreement, I could not
conceal from him—and he must by now be well aware himself—that the agreement
had caused the most profound surprise and disappointfhent in this country; and that,
whilst it was not for me to make any suggestion to the French Government as to what
they should do in the matter, 1 thought it would be very surprising if M. Briand, in
his reply, did not make some gesture in regard to this unfortunate pact, and thus give
some relief, to the feelings to which I had referred. The desirability of doing this
seemed to me to be very obvious in the interests of the larger union referred to.
Moreover, the unfortunate consequences of the agreement had already manifested
themselves, for the Kemalist party had displayed an attitude of intractability which
seemed decidedly ominous for the future. Elated by their agreement with Trance,
they had since manoeuvred to extract a similar agreement with Italy with the object,
undoubtedly, of isolating Great Britain and compelling her to be the last suitor for
their favours. These manoeuvres had failed, as the Italians had declined to conclude
an agreement at all and had withdrawn their envoy.
Nevertheless, the Angora Agreement had undoubtedly aggravated the perils of
the situation, and it was for the French Government to consider by what methods
they could extricate the Allies from the difficult position in which they had found
themselves placed.
The Count de Saint-Aulaire concluded by asking me for information about the
visits of Herr Stinnes and Herr Rathenau to this country.
I told him that 1 knew nothing about either, as the proposals of Herr Rathenau—
which, I imagined, would be closely analogous to the discussions which had taken
place between that gentleman and M. Loucheur—had not been brought before the
Cabinet. He said he hoped that before he returned to Paris on Monday I might be
able to give him some information on the point, which had excited a good deal of
apprehension in his own country.
Our conversation then terminated in as friendly a manner as it had begun.
1 am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
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