Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎125v] (250/348)

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which must be intensely distasteful to the Greeks, and which, it accepted, would impose
heavy sacrifices upon them, had nevertheless conveyed to the French Government the
impression that 1 was a political partisan, imposing upon them the obligation of stating
the Turkish case with a fervour and amplitude that would win the admiration even of
Mustapha Kemal.
But it may also be remarked in passing that the Greek Ministers have not
conversed with myself or with the British Government alone. Ihey did not come to
London until they had visited Paris and had the privilege of more than one conversation
with M. Briand, at that time Foreign Minister and President of the Council. They
have also been to Borne and enjoyed similar opportunities there. Conversely, the
French authorities, in spite of the advantages to which reference has already been made,
are not the sole persons who are acquainted with Turkish opinion, the British High
Commissioner at Constantinople having had frequent opportunities of conversing with
representatives both of the Constantinople and the Angora Governments at the Sultan s
capital. It would appear, therefore, that no one of the Great Powers has any claim to
be regarded as the special spokesman of this or that combatant party. It has
presumably been the desire of all the Allies to make themselves familiar with both
sides of the case, with the object of arriving thereby at a just'and equitable solution.
It must further be obvious that no discussion at Paris is likely to be fruitful—on
the contrary, it will be condemned to certain failure—if those who take part in it are
to be regarded in advance as advocates of this or that party or cause. The idea with
which the impending conversation was originally suggested by myself, and, as I
thought, accepted both by France and Italy, was that the three Powers should divest
themselves of all prepossessions, and should approach this most difficult question from
the widest standpoint and with the object not of gaining a victory either for Greeks or
Turks, but of removing a dark cloud from the Eastern landscape and of re-establishing
the peace of the world.
Bearing in mind this aim, it is difficult to understand what useful purpose can he
served by presenting, as is done in the French note, a historical narrative of recent
events which will hardly stand the test of impartial examination
The French Ambassador reminds us that Greece is still governed by the Sovereign
and the Government who were responsible for so unfriendly a policy in the early stages
of the war. But he fails to remember that Great Britain has no more responsibility for
either factor than has France, that British Ministers have expressed themselves with
just as much severity about the present Greek King as has done France, and that
public opinion in this country is no more favourable to that monarch than it is across
the channel.
What his Excellency, however, has omitted altogether to notice is that there was
a period, not far distant, when the Turks were a far more persistent, bitter and
formidable enemy to the Allied cause than any Greek Government ever attempted or
could have hoped to be, that by their action in closing the Straits and forcing hostilities
upon the Powers they prolonged the war for a period to be measured by years,
imposing upon the Allies, and upon Great Britain in particular, an appalling sacrifice
both of treasure and lives—a sacrifice which in the former respect has been continued
for more than three years after the conclusion of the armistice, but is now apparently
to be forgotten in the contemplation of the revived fortunes of the Angora Government
and the ancient misdeeds of the Greeks.
Even in this respect the French note appears again to deviate from the path of
fairness; for, in its anxiety to throw discredit upon the Greek army and authorities for
the atrocities committed in Asia Minor, it appeals to the international commissions of
enquiry, forgetting that in the published report of the principal of these, dated the
1st June, 1921, which investigated the circumstances of the Ismid evacuation, the
conclusion was stated over the signatures of the French and Italian as well as of
the British members of the commission that : “ There is no doubt that there has been
a large number of atrocities in the Ismid peninsula, and it appears that those on the
part of the Turks have been more considerable and ferocious than those on the part of
the Greeks.”
To distribute the responsibility for the terrible events that have occurred and are
still occurring in Asia Minor between Turks and Greeks is not required at the present
moment; but to ascribe them to one party alone is not only manifestly unfair but is
surely to contravene the spirit in which the impending discussion should take place.
It may be said indeed that the paragraph in question in his Excellency’s letter could,
by a merely verbal transposition of names, have been made to apply with almost equal
accuracy to the Turks as to the Greeks.