Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎132v] (264/348)

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tendency displayed by nil Persian Governments—-whatever their complexion —to play
off one Power against the other in order to gain the utmost advantage for themselves
hy the familiar processes of oriental diplomacy. Persian statesmen have found by past
experience that they can safely exploit the rivalries of Western nations hy these
traditional methods. They have indeed practised them from time immemorial upon
their own powerful tribes with unvarying success, and of recent years Great Britain and
Russia were deliberately played off one against the other, until these two Powers
endeavoured, by means of an agreement between themselves, to put an end to the
practice. The danger of allowing the Persians to carry on these methods with
impunity is self-evident. Unscrupulous Persian statesmen succeed in maintaining
themselves in office for a few months, during which they enrich themselves at the
expense of the country, while Persia gradually sinks further and further into anarchy
and decay, and no advantage accrues to her neighbours or to those who may seek to
befriend her.
The above account has not dealt with the enormous expenditure incurred by His
Majesty’s Government on military undertakings in Persia, on the building of roads
throughout the country, or on the upkeep for five years, from 1916 to 1921, entirely
at the charge of His Majesty’s Government, of the South Persia Rifles in Ears and
Kerman, which were armed and equipped in order to preserve some semblance of order
and security in the southern and eastern provinces during the war. So far from these
forces having been maintained in anv spirit of hostility to the Persian Government, it
was the latter that pleaded over and over again for their retention. The burden,
however, was one which neither the British nor the Indian Government were willing
any longer to bear, and in the course of 1921 the South Persia Rifles were finally
disbanded and the whole of the British forces were withdrawn.
The Persian army is at this moment under the command of a new general named
Reza Khan, who is at the same time Minister of War, and his expenditure on the army
is reported to reach the enormous sum of nearly 1,700,000Z. a year, which exceeds the
whole available yearly revenues of the State, leaving nothing for administrative
expenditure excepting that which Persia can secure from foreign countries by means
of loans.
It is obvious that such a state of things cannot continue and that the military
aspect of Persian finance is as much in need of a complete and drastic overhauling as
is every other part of the administrative machine.
The foregoing account, though it by no means covers the whole ground, will have
sufficed to give a general impression of the Persian situation as it appears to His
Majesty’s Government at the present time.
The principles which, it has been shown, must underlie the policy of the British
Government in the future, as in the past, may he clearly deduced fi\>m what has
preceded :—
1. The British Government are mainly concerned in the maintenance of Persia’s
independence and integrity, and are prepared to co-operate in any well-
planned efforts to sustain and revive her national existence.
2. The development of Persian resources and the revival of Persian trade by any"
legitimate means are equally an object of interest to Great Britain.
3. His Majesty’s Government have paramount interests in Southern Persia and the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. which impel them to take a special interest in those regions.
4. His Majesty’s Treasury cannot lose sight of the indebtedness of Persia to Great
Britain, and must look to the regular payment of interest and sinking fund
on these debts out of Persia’s available resources, some of which are already
pledged to her.
5. His Majesty’s Government, having tried unsuccessfully to assist Persia to
improve her internal administration and to introduce sound tinancial
methods, are prepared to extend a loy r al assistance to the United States
Government if the latter decide, after full consideration, to undertake the
task. The question by whom Persia is to be regenerated is of vastly" less
importance than that her regeneration should take place. A better chance
of effecting this end can hardly be imagined than that a great and friendly
and disinterested Power like the United States should be willing to enter
the field. Some things the United States Government will do best hy itself.
In others it may profit by the co-operation and support of those who
have been so long on the ground. From this point of view His Majesty’s
Government will give to any American officials who may be chosen hy the