Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎152r] (303/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
[244 i— 1] b
TURKEY. [February!).]
CONFIDENTIAL. Suction
[E 1386/1/44] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).
(No. 473.)
My Lord, Foreign Office y February 9, 1923.
1. HIS Majesty's Government have carefully considered the memorandum com
municated to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Paris on the 4th February by the French
President of the Council explaining the reasons which led M. Poincare to make
certain representations to the Angora Government through the French High Com
missioner at Constantinople on the 30th January. His Majesty’s Government regret
their inability to accept these explanations as satisfactory, for reasons which I will
now proceed to state.
2. I request your Excellency to read this despatch to M. Poincare and to leave
a copy with him, should he desire it.
3. It was on the 24th January, after proceedings which had already lasted for
nine weeks, and in spite of great concessions made in almost every field to the Turks,
had revealed but little inclination on their part to arrive at a final settlement, that
I discussed the whole situation with my colleagues, M. Bompard and the Marquis
Garroni. We then agreed upon a plan which would materially hasten the
conduct of business and serve to intimate to the Turkish delegation that a
limit must be set to the apparently endless debates which were gradually
whittling away all the advantages which the Allies might hope to obtain
from a treaty of peace. This procedure gave the Turkish delegation five days
in which to examine the treaty as a whole—a document with which, in fact,
on every question of importance or principle they had already long been
acquainted and which they had discussed in detail. On the third day they were to
be offered the opportunity of stating their case once again at a meeting of the three
main commissions, and it was to be clearly explained to them that, while the Allies
were prepared to hear the Turkish observations and to consider alterations of the
draft treaty on points of detail, there could be no question of reopening the debates
on points of principle. In the unhappy event of a refusal to sign the treaty, it was
to be made clear that no further discussion could be allowed to take place at
Lausanne, whence the Allied delegations would depart at the end of the week, except
for one or two subordinate officials capable of giving to the Turkish delegates any
explanations or details of the draft that might be required.
4. In discussing this plan with my Allied colleagues in the presence of several
witnesses, I fully explained that this procedure was not to be regarded asan ultimatum
to Turkey, and that I would be careful to say so to the Turkish delegation at the
official presentation of the draft treaty. The Turks would be free to ask for an
adjournment, and either stay at Lausanne to consider the draft, or refer for instruc
tions to Angora, or to proceed thither in person. The departure of the Allied
plenipotentiaries and the main body of experts would, however, preclude further
discussion of points of principle or further concessions upon them. We could at any
time reassemble for the signature of the treaty if the Turks agreed to sign.
5. This plan, formally agreed upon by the French, Italian and British pleni
potentiaries, was in course of being carried into effect. Its chances of success seemed
assured when the Allied delegations found, as they did, good reason to believe that
the Turks had recognised the necessity of coming to terms because they could not
afford to return to Angora without a peace treaty, that Ismet Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. had full powers
to sign, and that he was about to accept in all essential particulars the Allied terms.
On the 30th January, however, there appeared on the sheets of the Swiss Telegraphic
Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. at Lausanne a Havas Agenfcy telegram, the text of which is so important
that I give it in full in the first annex to this despatch. In spite of the semi
official character of the French agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. in question, no credence was attached to
the alleged contents of this surprising communication by the British delegation at
Lausanne, and, in order to dissipate the unfortunate effect which it was producing in
the circles of the conference, they so informed the press. On the 31st January,