Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎166r] (331/348)

CIRCULATED TO THE CABINET;
[This Document is the Property ot ms Britannic Majesty s Goyernment.J
No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.
TURKEY.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 4473/35/44]
No. 1 .
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).
(No. 1547.)
My Lord Foreign Office, May 2, 1923.
. ^ * rencil Ambassador came to me this afternoon with a telegram from
i I. Poincare in which the latter asked me to join him in protesting to the Turkish
Government against the alleged despatch of large Turkish forces in tiie direction of
Syria as involving a distinct menace to the Entente and a threat to the maintenance of
peace. M. Poincare was sending reinforcements of troops in that direction and
he thought it would be a good thing if the Turks realised that the British Government
were prepared to take similar action.
1 replied that I could not help being amused at this appeal from M Poincar^ I
recalled very well how, when I went over to Paris in the autumn ot last year and
appealed to M. Poincare to strengthen the Allied position in Constantinople and the
Straits, he replied to me over and over again, “ Not a man.” I recalled also how, when
I pressed him to say what the French Government would do if the Mudania Convention
were violated, and if the Turks forced their way into the neutral zones and embarked
upon hostilities, he more than once replied, “ Not a cartridge, not a shot.” Here was
the same M. Poincare now not only sending the reinforcements, but threatening the
cartridges and the shots, and inviting me to participate in the operation which he had
so vehemently repudiated only six months ago.
... While I did. not desire to criticise the conduct of the French Government and
while I thought it might.be even helpful in bringing the Turks to an understanding of
the realities of the situation, I did not feel disposed to take part in a joint representa
tion until the military menace, which was apparently directed against Syria was
applied to the.frontiers of Irak, for which Great Britain was more directly responsible.
In that case, I should not ask the French Government to join me in protesting to the
lurks; 1 should do it on my own account.
I thought, indeed, that the French protest was more likely to be successful if it
was made independently. The real place for joint action was at Lausanne. It was
only lecause there had not been that joint action in the concluding stages in February
last that the treaty had broken down. I was still pursuing the policy which I had
adopted then. The French might rely upon His Majesty’s Government to do all in
their power to present a united front at Lausanne, but I did not see any occasion at
the present moment for the joint representation to Angora which his Excellency had
suggested. J
He then passed on to say a few words about the question of Tangier M Poincare
had. examined the formula which I had submitted with regard to the future inter
nationalisation ol the Tangier port and zone as the basic principle upon which the
proposed conference between. Great Britain, France and Spain should be held.
M. oincare objected to this formula as involving too rigid a definition, and uro-ed me
most strongly not to persist in putting it forward, but to go into a conference in the
general behef that we were not so widely separated as might seem the case, and that
as the result of friendly conversations an agreement could be arrived at.
I replied that I saw nothing to justify this confidence. During the last three
years I had made repeated efforts, both in correspondence with Paris, in personal
conversations and in conversations between our respective representatives at Tangier
to arrive at the basis of an understanding between the French Government and
ourselves. On each occasion these attempts had ended in complete failure, and, for my
part, l oad no idea of presiding over a conference here, which in three or four days
from its commencement might break down because of an irreconcilable divero-ence of
views on the main principle involved, thereby inflicting what might be a very serious
blow to the Entente itself.
We already had trouble enough about the Ruhr. That, I hoped, we might
survive, but if on top ol tne Ruhr we were to hold an abortive conference about
I angler, I should view the consequences with great apprehension. The conference was
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