Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎167r] (333/348)

CI RCULAT E D T O THF CABINET
[This Docnment is the Property of His Britaamc Majesty s Government.]
TURKEY. [May 31.J
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 5670/1/44] No.L
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).
(No. 1851.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, May 31, 1923.
THE French Ambassador in the course of a lonij conversation this afternoon
raised several points of importance. The first of these was with regard to the steps
to he taken arising out of the probable conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne. Were
His Majesty’s Government, he asked, prepared to arrange for immediate evacuation
of their forces as soon as the treaty had been ratihed by Angora ? I said that the
reply must to some extent depend upon the probability of early subsequent ratification
by the Governments of Great Britain, Italy and France. 1 did not know whether a
Bill would be required in the British Parliament for the purpose, but 1 believed not.
In that case, although we were not legally bound to submit the case to Parliament,
in all probability we should do so, and a debate would take place in both Houses.
I did not anticipate this need take any length of time, inasmuch as everybody was
more than anxious to. conclude peace, and I thought that it ought to be possible
within a fortnight of acceptance by Angora for ratification to take place here. What
the Italian procedure might be, I did not exactly know, but I believed there would
be even less difficulty there. The point therefore remained, what would happen in
France?
Upon this the Ambassador explained that there might be delay, in view of the
necessary formalities of examination of the treaty by the various Foreign Affairs
Commissions, in obtaining ratification before the present parliamentary session came
to an end in July. He thought this was unlikely, but it was a contingency that might
have to be faced.
I then asked him two questions : firstly, whether there was the least likelihood in
these circumstances of the French Parliament requiring any modification of the text
when it had already been accepted at Angora; and, secondly, why it should not
be'possible for M. Poincare, even at the cost of a slight prolongation of the session, to
insist upon the matter being settled before the Chambre des Deputes trose.
The Ambassador replied that he did not think any modification was probable, but
French parliamentary difficulties were not so easily overcome. He even foresaw
that in that case ratification might be postponed till October.
I replied that this was a proposition which I viewed almost with dismay, and I
urged him to press upon his Government the supreme importance of expediting the
matter. When, however, I went on to ask him what he assumed would happen to the
treaty in the interval before ratification by France, assuming the latter to be delayed
till October, he greatly astonished me by replying that the treaty could not come
into operation in the interval, and apparently we should be driven back to the status
quo ante.
I told his Excellency quite plainly that I doubted very much whether the Turks
would accept this new situation. On the contrary, 1 anticipated that the moment they
had ratified they 7 would expect the treaty to come into operation at once, and a
postponement of four months was the last thing they had in mind. I said that I
would make enquiries upon this point, and that in the meantime the question of
evacuation could not be finally decided.
Count de Saint-Aulaire then went on to complain of an arrangement which had
been made between a British railway group for a railway in Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. with a Swiss
group, who held some of the shares. He contended that this was entirely 7 contrary to
the Treaty of Versailles, and could not be tolerated by the French Government. 1
was unaware of the case, which had not reached me officially, though I had reason to
believe that the facts were not at all as represented by him.
His Excellency 7 then proceeded to comment with some anxiety upon the
contemplated enquiry 7 into the administration of the Saar. Reading from a paper, which
he held in his hands and which he told me was a despatch from M. Poincare, but of
which he did not leave me a copy, he declared that France could not assent to any
enquiry into the Saar administration, that the recent strike had been a purely political
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