Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎169v] (338/348)

4:
Nevertheless, the alternative of a complete reversal oi the policy hit ei o
pursued is one that, whatever the price that might have to he paid for it, we * ia i ve ^
dogmatically refused to consider. The reasons, apart from those which ha\e aliea \
been indicated, which lead us to advise against such a course are these
1. We see no way of reversing the policy without throwing up the Mandate.
2. If we return the Mandate another claimant would very quickly be 101 h-
coming. Whether that claimant were France or Italy, the result wou d
be equally injurious to British and, as we think, to Palestinian, interests.
3. If no applicant were forthcoming and the Palestinian Arabs were left to
work out their own destiny, the sequel could hardly fail to be the return,
at no distant period, of the Turks. This would be an even more disastrous
consequence, and would, indeed, involve the final sacrifice of all lor which
we fought and won the Eastern war.
4. Although the strategical value of Palestine is rated by the Imperial General
Staff less highly than it had been placed by some authorities, yet none of
us can contemplate with equanimity the installation in Palestine of
another Power.
These considerations led us to a careful scrutiny of the position as it now stands.
Great harm has, no doubt, been done by the exaggerated pretensions of the Zionist
organisations and press at an earlier stage, and, if the Arabs have been badly
frightened, it has been largely in consequence of these mistaken tactics. During the
past year, however, the Zionist leaders have greatly modified both their claims and
their language, and their acceptance of the policy laid down by the late Government
in the White Paper of June 1922 has, we believe, been sincere and ungrudging. On
the other hand, the continuance of the agitation here, and perhaps also the change
of Government in England, have led the Arabs to think that a complete reversal of
policy is still possible, and that by refusing all compromise, perhaps even by
organising some form of passive resistance, they may induce His Majesty’s Govern
ment, if not to abandon the Mandate, at least to give to Palestine a full measure of
self-government which they could utilise to obtain a complete ascendancy over the
numerically small minority of Jews. It would appear to be from this standpoint
that the Arabs have boycotted the recent elections for the Legislative Council, and
may even, as some anticipate, have recourse to more extreme measures. The con
clusion that we deduce from these considerations is not that an agitation so inspired
and conducted should be yielded to, but that an early and firm decision is necessary
in order to prevent it from attaining a further and more dangerous momentum.
If this object is to be secured, the decision so arrived at should aim at meeting
those of the Arab grievances or complaints in which there is substance, without, at
the same time, breaking faith with those to whom we are deeply and honourably
pledged. Our search for this avenue of extrication has been materially assisted by
the complainants themselves. If we study their petitions and speeches we find
that it is not so much the existence of the Mandate, or the Balfour Declaration, or the
recognition of a Jewish National Home (in its later and narrower interpretation) to
which they object, as it is the preferential position which has been accorded to the
Zionists in the country, and the universal Arab belief that the scales are weighted
against the Arabs in the Administration. The appointment of a Jewish High
Commissioner, however able and impartial (and Sir H. Samuel has been both in no
ordinary degree); the existence of a Jewish Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. in Palestine with special access
to the High Commissioner; the not inconsiderable (although restricted) immigration
of many thousands of Jews since the war; the encouragement, however expedient
and cautious, of Jewish enterprise, e.g., the Rutenberg Concession, have all fostered
this belief that the Jews are being unduly favoured and that the Arabs are being
pushed into a background where the spoils of Palestine will be for others, and never
for them.
The question to be answered then is this : Is there any real ground for this
suspicion, and, if so, can it be relieved ?
At this stage our attention was turned to the exact words of the Mandate,
Article 4 of which runs as follows :—
“ An appropriate Jewish agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. shall be recognised as a public body for
“ the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of
“ Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establish-
“ ment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population
‘ in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to
“ assist and take part in the development of the country.