File 200/1928 Pt 8 'Anglo-Persian Negotiations' [‎365r] (736/1096)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROP^BXV Qg-MJii BBI,TANNIC MAJESTY'! GOYERNMENT
[ ~ 1
6024
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
' 1932,
E 4932/208/34]
No. 1.
J
September 27, 1932.
Section 1.
Mr. Hoare to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 27.)
No. 389. Confidential.)
ir Gulhek, September 10, 1932.
I HAVE reported in my telegram No. 127 of the 8th September, that at an
interview on the previous day, which I had felt bound to arrange in view of the
imminent departure of the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Geneva,
Teymourtache informed me that there was in his opinion no hope of bringing the
negotiations to a successful conclusion. In the case of Bahrein, the Persian
Government could only regard the status quo as an usurpation of Persian
territory; they were willing to consecrate that status quo in return for an adequate
quid pro quo, but there was nothing in the draft treaty which could possibly be
regarded as adequate. Bahrein had been an open sore for many years, and he felt
that it must be handled if not by friendly arrangement then by arbitration; and
yet he greatly disliked the idea of arbitration, partly because the Persian Govern
ment were, as compared with His Majesty’s Government, ill-equipped for the
preparation and debate of a case in arbitration, but also because the idea of the
public conduct of a dispute with His Majesty's Government was highly distaste
ful to the Persian Government, who, headed by the Shah, had greatly hoped to
reach a general settlement by negotiation.
2. I said that I did not really understand the Persian attitude. He had
told me more than once that Persia had no desire to possess Bahrein : evidence
of the very slight material importance which the Persian Government attached
to it was afforded by the fact that, though claiming both 1 amb and Abu Musa
to belong to Persia, they had none the less declared in the past that Persia s claims
in respect of Bahrein would be satisfied by the surrender of those two islands.
Teymourtache turned rather eagerly to Feroughi to obtain his confirmation that
this was still the Persian attitude. Continuing my argument, I said that I really
did not see why, even if they considered that the treaty as a whole or particulai
items of it constituted insufficient satisfaction, the Persian Government should
contemplate seeking an arbitration, which they would, I fancied, be to lose,
in respect of a territory which they did not wish to own. Feroughi said that in
view of the Clarendon letter it was not at all sure that they would lose. To which
I replied that we were satisfied that that letter did not bear the interpretation
which the Persian Government sought to give it. Teymourtache then answere
my question by indicating that in his view 7 Persia would derive some mora sa is-
faction, even if she lost her case, because the mere fact that His Majesty s Govern
ment had consented to arbitrate would be public evidence that they treated Persia
as an equal, whereas now we appeared to expect Persia to accept without
discussion and with gratitude whatever we chose to consider good tor er.
3. On the face of it, this is terribly far-fetched, but if Egyptian nationalism
sets a standard, there are, in my understanding of oriental nationalism, virtual^
no limits to the fineness of its susceptibilities. . ,, ^ i
4. I do not, of course, suggest that nationalistic susceptibility is the sole
or indeed the principal factor in Teymourtache s line of conduc . i • v
Practical side as well, and in this connexion T venture to quote from a lette
I wrote to Sir L. Oliphant on the 15th July, putting the pros and cons of the draft
treaty from what I conceive to be the Persian point of view .
“ The central and dominating factor is that whether I behave
well or ,11, sign a treaty or not, His Majesty’s Government’s displeasure will
never, never be pushed to the length of doing any , in ^ °i'^ l TTj s
centralised Administration which I have established not because
Majesty’s Government are saints and martyrs, but because they would very
particularly hate to see chaos in Persia.
1579 dd—11