Typescript and printed cabinet papers and parliamentary papers on events in Egypt [‎114v] (228/520)

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an essential preliminary to a policy of conciliation and it
lias been interpreted as such to a greater degree than was
be expected.
(/».) 1 must urge His Majesty s Government to abandon the hope
of finding any body of Egyptians of no matter what class,
party, or creed who will be willing to co-operate with us if
the policy which 1 am recommending is rejected. The
prospect of arriving at some such modus vivendi has made
it possible for me not only to consolidate for the time being
those elements which honestly wish for a settlement, but
even to gain to our side one or two ot the leading members
of Zaghlul’s Party and greatly to weaken its influence.
(c.) The question is not whether we can or cannot get an Egyptian
Government, but whether we are going to succeed or fail
in bringing Egypt back to government by legal and
constitutional methods.
(</.) It is the introduction of parliamentary institutions and not
the formal abolition of the protectorate that will be
mainly responsible for any increased power of resistance to
our views that the Egyptian Ministers may acquire under
the proposed arrangements as compared with taut which
their predecessors possessed before the war. \et 1 presume
that llis Majesty’s Government would not wish to oppose
the creation of such institutions pending the conclusion of
a treaty with Egypt. Such a policy would obviously be
difficult to defend on general grounds, apart from which
it should be noted that in recent years the pressure of
public opinion voiced both in the press and through less
reputable channels lias produced an unmistakable increase
in the independence of Ministers, vis-a-vis the British
authorities.
The administration of Egypt has in the past been carried on by.
Egyptians with the assistance and advice of a very small body of
Englishmen, and this has only been possible owing to the maintenance
of good relations with their Egyptian colleagues. The great
majority of administrative posts have alw ays been filled by Egyptians
and it must not be imagined that even in the most peaceful and
normal times the English have tried to govern Egypt save as a small
leaven relying on the largest measure of native co-operation.
Your Lordship may rest assured that no opportunist desire for
immediate peace has inspired my proposals which are based upon
what 1 sincerely believe to be the best interests both of Egypt and of
Great Britain.
This is my final considered opinion which I have formed after
prolonged discussion with those who are best fitted to offer sound
advice. The opinions of responsible Egyptians - have also been
extensively consulted and they unanimously support my view.
If my proposals are accepted without delay I am convinced that
they will lead to a permanent settlement of the Egyptian question;
if they are rejected the only alternative that I can foresee will be
repressive measures that will ultimately compel us to annex Egypt.
No problem of government will be solved in this manner, but the
difficulties of Great Britain will be largely increased.