File 7251/1920 Pt 3 'Arabia: Situation and Policy; Agenda for Inter Departmental Committee Meetings' [‎210v] (57/268)

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The payment of a subsidy to the Emir at Nejd has also been continued since the
Armistice largely in the interests of the pilgrimage. The Emir is described as
being in a permanent state of financial difficulty. His military strength, however,
is believed to be adequate to enable him to undertake a successful invasion of the
Hejaz on the west or a raid on the south-west portion of Mesopotamia on the east.
The opportunities for plunder offered by such expeditions would provide him with
an easy and tempting means of replenishing his Treasury. An invasion of the
Hejaz by the Wahabis in the early part of the last century resulted in a general
massacre of the inhabitants, and such an invasion to-day would in all probability at
least result in the closing of the pilgrimage. The dangers of a raid into Mesopo
tamia are obvious. In the event of a preliminary success, Ibn Saud would probably
be joined by the local tribes, who would be ready to seize such a favourable oppor
tunity for plunder, and he might also meet with some support from the Extremist
Party in Bagdad and elsewhere. At present, however, Ibn Baud’s attitude to His
Majesty’s Government is perfectly friendly, and there is no reason to suppose that
he now contemplates any aggression against Mesopotamia.
It is hoped to avert the danger of an attack on the Hejaz by the proposed
personal meeting between the two rulers. In the meanwhile Ibn Baud is receiving a
subsidy of 75,000 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. per month from Mesopotamian funds. In the event of a
satisfactory agreement being reached at his meeting with King Hussein, the question
of the reduction of this amount will be open to reconsideration, but till the meeting
has taken place any reduction would seem inadvisable.
Foreign Office, July 7, 1920.
[E 6180/2854/44]
Field-Marshal Viscount Allenhy to Earl Curzon.—{Received June 10.)
(No. 559.)
My Lord, Cairo, May 28, 1920.
I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks on the question of the grant
of subsidies to Arab rulers, with reference to your Lordship’s despatch No. 532 of the
4th May, transmitting the minutes of a meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 17th
April, in which I observe that the Treasury are not yet convinced of the necessity for
the continuance of the subsidies.
It appears to me that to arrive at a just decision on this subject it is necessary in
the first place to compare the position of the different rulers now and before the war,
to weigh the services of each during that period, to examine whether any responsi
bility rests on His Majesty’s Government for the changes which have occurred, and,
finally, to consider whether, on grounds of morality or expediency, it is justifiable to
impose on the'British taxpayer the burden of providing some or all of them with
monetary assistance in the future.
The beginning of the war saw an effective, if not entirely efficient, Ottoman
administration in the Hejaz and Temen; Ibn Rashid a mediatised Turkish vassal;
the Idrisi in revolt against the ruling power, but already discussing terms of peace;
and Ibn Baud, who had not long before ejected the Turks from Hasa and Qatif,
showing a disposition to resume his allegiance, provided that he was allowed a free
hand as Vali of Nejd, and given an adequate stipend. It will be seen that the feeling
or racial consciousness, which is now so marked, was already showing itself even in
the moie remote parts of the Peninsula, but a study of the records of the time will
also show that the Ottoman Government, however unwillingly, was beginning to
realise its incapacity to retain by force the Arab countries, and was preparing to
grant a measure of self-government which might satisfy the aspirations of its
inhabitants.
The consideration of the subject was, however, abruptly broken off by the
commencement of the war, and after the Ottoman Government had declared against
e Allied Powers, Great Britain, taking advantage of the discontent which already
exis ed, ma.de promise to the Shereef of Mecca, Ibn Baud and the Idrisi, which induced
them definitely to cast off their allegiance and throw in their lot with the Allies. I
o not propose to examine and compare in detail the services performed by these three
rulers, but I think it may fairly be said that each, according to his capacity, rendered
real and effective assistance at a time when the result of the war still hung in the
balance and, by so doing, brought to nought the plans for a Jehad, diverted or rendered