Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎3r] (7/380)

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name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances, and
make the following reply to your letter :—-
“ ‘ Subject to the above modifications. Great Britain is prepared to recognise
and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in toe
limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca 7 ” (p. 53).
It will be noted that the reservation in favour of French interests, even within the
narrower boundaries of Arab independence here proposed, prepared the ground
for the establishment of Area A.
On the 5th November, in his third letter, the Sherif agreed to the exclusion
of Mersina and Adana, but formally reiterated his claim to the rest :— 0
“ In order to facilitate an agreement and to render a service to Islam, and at
the same time to avoid all that may cause Islam troubles and hardships—-seeing
moreover that we have great consideration for the distinguished qualities and
dispositions of the Government of Great Britain—we renounce our insistence
on the inclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. But
the provinces of Aleppo and Beirout, and their sea-coasts, are purely Arab
provinces, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab : they
are both descendents of one forefather ’’ (p. 92).
It may be remarked that he does not mention either the vilayet of Lebanon or the
sanjak of Jerusalem—territories which were both excluded from the independent Arab
State in the subsequent Anglo-French Agreement. But he has expressly claimed
Lebanon on other occasions since then, and his reference to the Christian Arabs
here implies its inclusion.
The policy laid down with regard to the Christians was evidently inspired by the
Damascus Committee, for Faroki, in his conversations at Cairo, stated their views on
the point thus : —
“ The basis of the new Arab Empire will be national, not religious. It will be
an Arab, not a Moslem Empire. Christian Arabs, Druses, and Nosairia will have
the same rights as Moslems, but the Jews will be governed by a special law.” ()
The Sherit’s renunciation of Mersina and Adana and guarantees to the Christian
Arabs were taken note of by Sir H. McMahon in his third letter of the 13th December,
1915. His reiterated claim to Aleppo and Beirout vilayets was ignored (p. 102).
On the 1st January, 19 i 6, in his fourth letter to Sir H. McMahon, the Sherif
answered by declaring that he would not press his claims against France till after the
war, but announcing his intention of then doing so :—
“ As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in
our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications; and all this was
done only so as to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of
the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled
us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and
the agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities ; yet
we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that, at the first
opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes
from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirout and its coasts ....
(P- U-)- ...
“ It is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France or any other Power
a span of land in those regions” (p. 11 >).
Sir H. McMahon answered this in his fourth letter of the 30 th January 191G, by taking
note of the Sherif s “ desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance
of Great Britain and France,” and warning him that the friendship between the two
countries would endure after the war (Part II, p. 5). The Sherif, on his part, never
referred to the boundary question again during tlie negotiations, but there is evidence
to show that the claims not accepted by Fits Majesty’s Government have not been
withdrawn by him.
5 This formula (and not the Damascus-Homs-iiama-Aleppo line) was proposed to Sir Mark Sykes by
Faroki about the beginning 1 of .November (p. 1U4). Faroki and the Sherif were in communication through
the iiherifs messenger to Cairo. 6 157740/15 : Faroki’s statement, p. 10.
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