Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎140r] (283/380)

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land. These borders in southern Syria, south of Hauran, will be under
British influence, Ruwallali of Jof will turn to native market towns (such
as Salt or Madabah) which we choose to organise and enlarge in Moab, and
unless hand of British Political Officer on the Euphrates loses its cunning,
the Anazeh of Central Arabia will turn more readily to him than to his
French colleagues in Damascus, charm they never so wisely.”
9. It is suggested, therefore, that if the French cannot be induced to quit Syria
altogether, we should at all events endeavour to persuade them, in exchange for
Armenia, to give up Area A, or at least the part of it east of the Euphrates, and to
recognise the Ruwallah-Anazeh country as lying outside either sphere. The status
of Nuri Shaalan would then be the same as that of Bin Sand or Bin Rashid.
IV.
10. It is noticed that the Memorandum does not mention the Baghdad Railway.
But it is a British desideratum of the first magnitude that the section in the British
sphere should be the property of the Arab State and British controlled, without any
foreign voice in either the finance or the administration. The same applies to
that part of the concession which relates to the construction of ports at Baghdad
and Basra, and to mineral rights, as well as to any rights to participate in the
navigation of the rivers which may have arisen out of the concession.
A. II.
30th November 1918.
APPENDIX.
[Guarantee to Bin Saud.)
The point is so important that it is worth while to set out the facts at length.
Bin Sand 's original draft, which was communicated to us in January 1915, when
our negotiations with the Shereef were in their infancy, and the only enemy on the
horizon was the Turk, proposed that “ Great Britain shall undertake defence of his
territories from all external aggression and encroachment on the part of any other
Power, whether by land or sea.” On this Sir P. Cox commented (telegram of 16th
January 1915) :—“ When we invited Bin Saud to move on Basrah we undertook to
“ protect him against reprisals by Turks, so that, as far as latter are concerned, what
Bin Saud now asks us to give does not amount to much more. Apart from Turks,
“ Central Arabia is practically inaccessible by land to any Power but ours, and I
“ venture to think that we should incur little risk by giving the desired undertaking
“ subject to the reservation that aggression be unprovoked.” (P. 56Ib/15.)
Accordingly Article 2 of the British counterdraft ran :—“ In the event of unprovoked
“ aggression by any foreign Power . . . the British Government will aid Bin
“ Saud to such extent and in such manner as the situation may seem to them to
“ require.” Bin Saud, replying on 24th April, struck out “ unprovoked ” (on the
ground that it was^tautological, since the Arabic word meant “molestation without a
cause ”), and for the last words substituted “will aid Bin Saud in all circumstances
and in any place.” (P. 2832/15.) On 16th August His Majesty’s Government
ordered that “ unprovoked ” should be restored, and that if Bin Saud would not
agree to the original language the following might be accepted :—“ Will aid Bin
“ Saud to such extent and in such manner as British Government, after consultation
“ with Bin Saud, may consider most effective for protecting his interests.”
(P. 2966/15.) Bin Saud was obdurate as regards “ unprovoked,” but accepted
another important modification, and in the Treaty signed on 26th December 1915 the
material part of Article 2 runs : —
“ In the event of aggression by any foreign Power . . . without reference
to the British Government and without giving her [sic] an opportunity of com
municating with Bin Saud and composing the matter, the British Government will
aid- Bin Saud to such extent and in such manner as the British Government, after
consulting Bin Saud, may consider most effective for protecting his interests and
countries.” IP. 668/16.)