Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎142v] (288/380)

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The question of the meaning of the term “foreign Power” was soon raised,
hor in September I91G, Bin Sand having expressed mistrust of the Shereef’s
intentions, Sir P. Cox proposed to reply that “ no present or future understandings
between us and the Shereef would prejudice our adherence to the terms of Articles
1 and 2 of our Treaty with him of 20th December 1915 ” (telegram of 8th September
1910), and the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. (with Foreign Office concurrence, W. 183725/16)
instructed Sir P. Cox on 19th September that “reference to treaty should be confined
“ t0 Article 1, as we could not admit that Article 2 is binding on us as against other
“ Arabs.” JP. 3827/16.) Accordingly Sir P. Cox wrote to Bin Sand on 18th
October:— As for ourselves vis-a-vis yourself and the Shereef, have we not our
treaty with you, in Article 1 of which we have recognised you as independent ruler
of your territories of Nejd ? Of course the Shereef must naturally recognise this
treaty also, and His Majesty’s Government would by no means support him in an\ r
“ other attitude towards you.” (P. 4918/16.)
The question came up again in August last, when Captain Wilson, in his
telegram No. 6491 of the 8th August, recommended that Bin Sand should “ be
informed in writing that Article 2 of Treaty of 26th December 1915 [ie., the Article |
guaranteeing him against aggression by ‘ any foreign Power ’] applies equally to
aggression by King Husain. ’ The point was considered by the Eastern Committee
on the 15tli August, and on the same day the Secretary of State telegraphed to India
and Baghdad that the proposal was “open to objection that it places a doubtful
interpretation on Article 2 of Treaty with Bin Sand." It does not appear that the
Eastern Committee was aware of the earlier and more categorical decision to the
same effect.
Captain Wilson reverted to the point in his telegram No. 8789, of 16th October
1918, m which he again invited His Majesty’s Government “ to consider possibility of
making declaration on the lines of paragraph 1 ’ of his telegram No. 6491 quoted
above. The Secretary of State replied to Captain Wilson, with Lord Curzon’s
concuirence (28th October): W e do not think it advisable to make declaration in
terms of Baghdad telegram No. 6491.” The utmost length to which His Majesty’s
Government appear to have gone in their commitments to Bin Saud is to “recognise
our obligations to use every influence in our power to prevent encroachments upon
Dm Sand s teiritories (telegram of 15th August 1918, communicated to him
2/th August, see Baghdad telegrams 7548 and 7550 of 10th September 1918).
It may be added that Bin Saud himself does not seem ever ,to have appealed to
Article 2 of the 1 reaty. His complaint has been that he was being attacked not by a •
foieign Powei, but by an ally of Great Britain, who was using British gold to fight
against him instead of against the Turk. But after the war the flow of British gold
to potential aggressois will presumably cease, or be reduced to an insignificant stream ;
and our most effective means of securing that such order as is necessary for our purpose
is maintained will probably be the grant of small subsidies to those who are charged
with the duty of keeping the routes open, and their prompt withdrawal from those who
offend.