Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎144r] (291/380)

surely be only one answer to such a question. Mesopotamia is on a different footing
from Syria or Palestine. We owe nothing there to outside assistance, Arab or
European. We fought the whole campaign unaided, and have administered the
occupied territories on oar own lines, without external help. That the work has been
well done, and solid foundations laid of'a new political system, is generally admitted.
It can be to nobody’s interest, least of all to that of the local inhabitants, that we
should leave our task unfinished. As the head of the American Relief Mission to
Persia recently remarked to the Civil Commissioner at Baghdad : “ You British must
stay here to carry on this great work in the interests of the world.”
0. Moreover, we have a strategic interest in Mesopotamia. The story of
German penetration in the direction of the Persian Gulf—the celebrated “ Berlin-
Baghdad ” project—is well known. It was recognised even before the war as a
direct menace to our position in India. By good fortune the enemy designs were
still incomplete when the war broke out. We were able, within a very few weeks of
Turkey’s intervention, to occupy Basra ; and, by the time that Turkey sued for an
armistice, had pushed our front northwards beyond Baghdad to the very gates of Mosul.
It is essential to the safety of India that our rivals should in no circumstances and
under no conditions whatsoever be permitted to resume their operations after the war.
A barrier must be set up in Mesopotamia, whatever its precise form, that will
effectually close the land line to the head of the Gulf against any potential enemy of
the British Empire.
10. If this object is to be achieved, it may be regarded as axiomatic (1) that no
part of Mesopotamia should be restored to the Turks; and (2) that at any rate the
portion of the conquered territories lying nearest the Gulf (i.e., the Basra Vilayet)
should remain under effective British control. Annexation having been, ruled out,
even as regards the Basra Vilayet, the most favourable alternative appears to be the
establishment of an Arab State under British control. This being so, we should at
least aim at securing that the control is real and exclusive, and leaves uo opening for
the machinations of foreign Powers. So far as Basra is concerned, this is vital. We
need be under no illusions as to the ability of an Arab administration, if left to itself,
to resist foreign intrigue or to bar the way to foreign encroachment. It is not
enough to expel the Turk. We cannot afford to leave a vacuum for others to fill. It
is essential that we should control, and effectively control, the external relations of
the Arab State. If there is to be a fair diplomatic field and no favour, we run the
risk that German diplomacy (supposing Germany to regain anything like her old
strength and ambitions) will beat us with the Arabs, just as it beat us with the Turks.
In that event, the results of our vast military efforts during the last four years might
conceivably be neutralised. We might even (to put an extreme case) live to see
another Baghdad railway contract granted by an Arab Government ; or, if we relax
our control over Basra and the surrounding district, we may start the next war with
the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab fortified by German engineers as strongly as the mouth
of the Thames, and with German submarine bases all along the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . The
risk is one that we cannot afford to take.
11. This is of course an extreme case. What may more probably be expected
to happen, if a vacuum is left, is this. The Germans will be driven to seek raw
material wherever they can find it, and not only to obtain it for themselves, but to
make it difficult for us to obtain it. A peaceful commercial penetration of Mesopo
tamia is therefore indicated. But commercial penetration means political penetration,
and political penetration—if the object is to make difficulties for us—means the
creation and encouragement of* every kind of anti-British feeling (and experience has
shown that in such circumstances the Germans do not shrink from playing on
anti-Christian feeling) in a particularly sensitive region. We should find ourselves
engaged in constant small feuds in Arabia, Mesopotamia, and on the coast of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ; German warships would appear in those waters : the impotent and
incapable Persia would be drawn in ; Pauislamism would lift up its head again—and
all the predisposing causes of an international quarrel would be reproduced.
12. It is obvious, then, that the work to be done in Mesopotamia, if regard be had
to its nature and magnitude, to the size of the area concerned, and to the neighbours
with whom the country must stand in relation, is one which can only be performed by a