Report of the Special Mission to Egypt under Lord Milner, and related papers [‎3r] (5/473)

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Great Britain’s claim to exercise some measure of control over E.^ypt rests upon
certain vital considerations, of which, the following are the chief :
(a.) It is essential for the welfare and progress of Egypt that the restrictions
which the Capitulations impose upon her, especially in the matter of
taxation of foreigners, should disappear, but Great Britain cannot insist on
the surrender of these privileges without making herself responsible for the
defence of the legitimate rights of foreigners.
(b.) The great progress made by Egypt of recent years is the work of Great
Britain, and Great Britain is entitled to watch over the results of her
efforts until their continued maintenance is assured. _ ^
(c.) A recurrence of disorder in Egypt, while menacing European interests in the
interior of the country, would also involve danger to the Suez Canal, in
which international highway Great Britain has a special interest by virtue
of her part ownership of the Canal itself, of its importance as the road to
India and Australasia, and of the fact that more than half the vessels using
the Canal are British.
In determining the measure of control which Great Britain must continue to
exercise over Egypt, and for her right to exercise which any treaty must provide, we
should be guided by the principle that it is desirable to restrict the direct exercise of
British authority to the narrowest possible limits, and outside these limits to rely upon
the moral influence of British officials serving under Egyptian Ministers in a genuinely
Egyptian Administration.
The object of any treaty being to effect a real reconciliation and to lead to more
harmonious co-operation between British and Egyptians, great latitude must be left to
the negotiators m settling details. A good deal that is not in itself desirable from the
point of view of efficiency may have to be conceded in order to arrive at a genuine
agreement, and put an end to the present friction, which threatens to result in a
complete breakdown of the existing system of government.
At the same time, certain fundamental positions cannot be abandoned without
condemning the whole policy of agreement, which is necessarily an experiment, to
failure. .
The most important point to be safeguarded is the influence and prestige of the
High Commissioner, who should remain in charge of the foreign relations of Egypt, in
so "far as they are of a political character, and be the recognised defender of the
legitimate rights of foreigners in the country.
The application to foreigners of any Egyptian legislation should therefore be
conditional on the concurrence of the High Commissioner.
At the same time, there should be an Egyptian High Commissioner in London
to look after Egyptian interests, to be the exponent of the views of the Egyptian
Government to the British Government and to supervise the selection of British officials
for the Egyptian service.
Great Britain, having undertaken the responsibility for the defence of Egypt,
must have the right to retain a military force in that country, to make use of its
harbours, aerodromes and lines of communication and to establish and maintain
W/T stations.
While Great Britain must retain complete freedom to determine the strength and
distribution of the British forces in Egypt, it is obvious that, if a treaty such as is
here contemplated were to be concluded, the strength of those forces could lie reduced
to very small proportions.
Great Britain’s responsibility for the protection of foreign interests further
involves a certain degree of control over the Egyptian Departments charged with the
conduct of finance and with the maintenance of justice and public security.
The exact form which this control should take is a matter for negotiation, but it
will probably be found to involve the retention of at least two British advisers, with
their staffs, in the Egyptian service. These must continue to be nominated by the
British Government, and the extent of their authority should be clearly defined.
With the exceptions aforesaid, the Egyptian Government should have complete
control of Egyptian affairs, including the commercial relations of Egypt with foreign
countries, and should have the right of concluding treaties of a non-political character
with the assent of Great Britain.
It follows from the preceding articles that the Egyptian Government must in
future be free to determine for itseif, what posts in the Egyptian service, other than
those to which Great Britain will retain the right to nominate, should be filled by
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