Report of the Special Mission to Egypt under Lord Milner, and related papers [‎54r] (107/473)

n aval strategy as affected by THE PHOPOSEH Ftmn® STATUS Ot EGYPT.
Mapiorandun tr/ th e Chi e f of the Tfe-iraT St.a-Pf .
+ n +v„ . In Vi °’ v 0f the far ~T'9»chinf? prop< jals with repard
to the futars Government of Egypt which ai 9 now before the
qhn t j i [issirable that the naval aspect of this question
should be clearly stated, as the decision which will he taPen^a
one of vi-&al importance to our Naval Strategy. ~ ' n is
+ >„ ?’+ T !? 9 * ^' ,ie sea oorrlmu nioatior.s of the sVrtr.B
the duty of the Navy, and one of the main artor-is o? ±
comnunicaticns, connecting the United Kingdom with India
Austral la, and our othor territories in thA ’
through Umt „ Eggp,,. 1 Thr«vS»S O? t?3;i 0 To S t"L
Cape route m the evert of the Canal not being available vomc
be a very grave disadvantage. ’ available would
3. The soafety of the Suez Canal route to the East is a
matter of more urgent importance at the present time than ever
si'tuati 0 n°which ha 3,8011 that we , are callG ^ ’ J P°n to face a naval
situation which has never previously arisen.
4. "Up to the time or the late War, the principal forelcrn
™ P°T wa . 3 concentrated in Europe, and necessitated a ^
-liar concentration of our naval forces. At the present ttno
our only two serious rivals on the sea - Japan and the U 3 a^
are to be found in widely separated quarters of the globe "and it
is impraotioabl 0 to keep the fleet at a sufficient strength to
effect the double oonoentration at home and in the East ^hich’would
enable us to meet the situation satisfactorily.
preponderance^l^ali^ooean^by^its'mobility ^hatl IT ° f h +
of P the t Ljire! ff90t±ne & qUl0k pas3a « e t0 threatenTportion
vital "part” f Ia0billt ' V the Suez Oanal plays a
vital part. The alternative route to the East, via tbe Cape is
far longer, and time may bo of the utmost importance* •" th e P ’
a « OVW Of Empire likTS^Tng may be
decided by the availability of the Canal route. ^
link 7 in the 6 chain o?T ^ ltS appr ° aohes ar ® ^ most delicate
ixnio m ine chain of naval communications with the East since
w<»s^Sij,*i^nsur Mt * ok fr ”«“*««
..b, *** ”• "»* *
(Sd.) BEATTY.
27 . 10 . 20 .