Report of the Special Mission to Egypt under Lord Milner, and related papers [‎173v] (349/473)

A base for aircraft working with the navy is essential to the senior service in the
Eastern Mediterranean. The northern coast of Egypt offers the most favourable site
for such a base.
4. Her convenience as a training ground for Royal Air Force personnel.
The climate of Egypt renders the country peculiarly suitable for flying training.
Not only is the weather uniformly fine, but personnel become to some extent ycclimatised
and prepared for the conditions they M ill meet further east.
The importance of Egypt to the Royal Air Force has led to the establishment of
large training stations, workshops and depots in the country, and large expenditure has
been incurred thereon ; it is important from a strategical, economical and administrative
point of view that the facilities for air work so laboriously built up shall not be impeded
by any change of status of the country. The Air Force is only iiom’ in a process of
formation ; disorganisation at this stage of its growth will delay for years the fulfilment
of its possibilities.
The Effect of the Milner Proposals.
The original press report of the proposals of Lord Milner’s Commission alluded to
the withdrawal of the British garrison to a small enclave An area of land belonging to one country and entirely surrounded by land of just one other country. on the Canal and its reduction
to a figure of 3,000-5,000 all ranks. It is now seen that this assumption M as incorrect,
and Lord Milner states that the treaty to be concluded should enable us to keep such
forces in the country as M 7 e require for Imperial purposes and station these at such
points as we desire. This is satisfactory if it is really feasible.
But is it possible to keep large military establishments in an independent country
in which we have no responsibility for maintaining law and order and no control in
peace over essential communications, such as roads, railways and telegraphs? Would
there not be considerable difficulty in persuading the Egyptian Government that such a
scheme M T as not, in practice, a veiled “ occupation ”? And is there not more than a
possibility that to get rid of British occupation, rather than the achievement of
independence, may once more speedily become the platform of the Egyptian
“ Nationalists ” of the future ? For the present. Lord Milner assures us that the
extremists alone demand the complete removal of British troops; but who is to say that
the future rule of the country may not be extremist in tendency ?
There are, therefore, political difficulties to the maintenance in peace of British
troops in an independent Egypt, and these may be intensified in case of war. The
British Government is to have a somewhat nebulous control over Egyptian foreign
policy, but we may find ourselves fighting an Arab State, not actually allied to Egypt
(granted that our control of policy is real), but u ith whom the Egyptians are in fullest
sympathy. Our air operations M^ould necessarily be based on Egypt, and our position
would be intolerable. Such difficulties may well increase if pan-Islamism becomes a
real force, for our possible enemies in the neighbourhood of Egypt will be largely
Mohammedan.
Internallv the situation may M'ell become unsatisfactory; there is nothing to
prevent the Egyptians from adopting conscription and raising an army formidable in
numbers if not in fighting temper. The danger is admittedly not great, but it must
not be overlooked. On the other hand, Egypt may neglect her fighting and police
forces, and be unable to repress disorders consequent on a venal administration. The
situation of British troops “ for Imperial purposes ” in the midst of a disorderly and
discontented population would be unenviable, and incidents could easily arise which
would lead to international complications. The Air Force is intimately concerned in this
matter since air units cannot be stationed in countries of potential unrest without
a garrison of army troops. Again, should the Egyptians neglect their fighting forces,
the British people will have to shoulder an unwarrantable burden to guarantee the
country against outside aggression, and the calls on the British fighting services may
be greatly increased and uncontrollable.
If it is difficult to imagine a satisfactory position in the present time, the future
appears to offer further possibilities of trouble. What is to happen if a future
Government of Egypt desires to repudiate the treaty with Great Britain ? Are they
to be coerced into its retention by force of arms ? Such action is hardly consistent with
the principles of self-determination. Or having granted independence, must we abandon
what we cannot retain by peaceful means ? The answers to the questions must be given
by politicians, but the Air Service is unwilling to build up an organisation of which the