'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎8v] (21/136)

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"We are being rapidly ousted from the Khorassan market. In Tehran itself
our trade is undoubtedly suffering and will suffer more as the Resht road is
opened to traffic. In the north-west our Trehizond trade has fallen off to a
serious extent. Even in the Gulf ports, where by the way there has been some
attempt at Belgian and German competition, we are not doing as well as
we might be. The shrinking of our Khorassan trade has told here, and the
most recent returns cannot, I think, be regarded as satisfactory.
On the other hand, it must not be supposed that recent changes in Persia
have all been unfavourable to our interests. This is not the case. In one
respect we have reason to be very well satisfied. Three years ago almost every
man in the country, Persian or European, believed that the death of the Shah
'would be the signal for general disorder, and for some marked advance on the
part of Russia, posssibly involving the break up of the country. I stated in
my memorandum of 1895 my reasons for doubting the correctness of this view,
• but it was the prevalent view, and I asked
Paragraphs and i . Her Majesty’s Government to make timely
preparations. This danger at least has been averted. When His Majesty was
murdered, it was very doubtful whether there would not be an outbreak of the
Tehran garrison, which would have been followed by serious trouble all over
Persia, and the Russian troops were in fact held in readiness for an immediate
advance; but thanks to English money the outbreak did not take place and
the succession was peaceful. If the present Shah should die as suddenly as his
father, we may reasonably hope that the succession will again pass over quietly.
This is no doubt a negative gain, but from our point of view it is very import
ant. The Shah too, though weak, is well meaning, and not I think at all
inclined to submit to Russian dictation. He has retained his English doctor
in spite of determined attacks on the part of the Russian and Erench Legations,
who wanted to put in a Erenchman, and he has nominated as his heir apparent,
See paragraph 17 of the memorandum of 1895. ^ e . MeSt SOn ’ T 1 ' 0 Wa ? °PP«Sed by the
Russians; and his most influential adviser,
the Hakim-ul-Mulk, is believed to be very friendly to us.
To turn to other matters mentioned in my memorandum of 1895 and
connected points, we have defined the long disputed boundary between Persia
and Kalat, and have pushed forward from India along the trade route to
Seistan, and have sent officers into Seistan itself, and have made arrangements
for the improvement of the trade route from Ahwaz to Ispahan. We have
severely punished a tribe on the Gulf coast, which was responsible for the
murder of one of our telegraph officers, and we have sent a detachment of
British Indian troops to protect the telegraph line for the future. This has
had a good effect. Disturbances have occurred in Kalat territory, but they
have not spread to Persian Baluchistan, and the ruler of this important pro
vince has throughout behaved in the most friendly manner. On the Karim,
at Shuster, our people have suffered seriously from the fanaticism of the town
mob, which has been fostered, if not created, by the weakness of the Persian
Government; but we are on good terms with the Arabs and Bakhtiaris who
hoffi the neighbouring country, and a little decided action on the part of the
Persian Government would soon set matters right in Shuster itself, where the
peopie were at one time particularly friendly to us. In the south we have o-reatly
strengthened our position by insisting upon, and obtaining, the removal of an
obnoxious Governor of Bushire. I dwelt in my memorandum of 1895 upon
Paragraph 25. the importance of the principle involved,
oi • x m-i ^ . anc ^ I would invite special attention to
the point. The effect of the case has been most remarkable. Altogether it is
certain from the reports of officers, who have had recent opportunities of
indeed”' ^ m ^ S0Uthern zone our re P u tation just now stands very high
, .p’ Tehra " itself we have had to deal, and still have to deal, with some
hostility or obstructiveness on the part of influential officials, but amon» them
also our action m the south has had its effect, and recent events in the Soudan
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