'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎37r] (78/136)

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n has beenJ**
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1881 ,
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from tBe neighbourhood of Quetta via Nushki, not to Seistan, but to Safar on
the Helmand. This proposal was put forward, without any reference to Persia,
for strategical reasons, namely, in order to prevent, at any future period, a
Russian advance upon Kandahar. It is interesting to me to learn from a
study of the papers, what I did not know before, viz., that five years later, when
I was travelling in Persia, and was first writing about this question, it had just
been raised both in India and in Persia by a report from Colonel Bell, at that
time head of the Intelligence Department in India, who in the autumn of
1888 marched from India by Kharan and Mashkel to Seistan, and strongly
recommended the construction of a railway, and a lease in perpetuity of Seistan
from the Persian Government, with a view to the grant of a great irrigation
concession to Reuter or to some other Company. The suggestion was eagerly
taken up by Sir H. D. Wolff, whose imagination was at that time suffused with
halcyon dreams of a regeneration of Persia by universal railways; and was
recommended by him both to the Government of India and to Lord Salisbury.
Lord Lansdowne’s Government in a telegram, dated January 20th, 1889, said
that “ Railway extension through Baluchistan was regarded by the military
authorities as a most valuable adjunct to the defences of India and as deserving
of the utmost encouragement”. Sir IT. Wolff’s proposals did not make much
advance, hut were reiterated by him in despatches to the Bo reign Office, dated
July 25th, and August 19th, 1890. Unfortunately in these, as in his original
despatch of Pebruary 19th, 1889, Sir H. Wolff rested his defence of the
scheme upon extremely contentious and entirely unacceptable grounds. He
advocated it for two reasons : as a menace to the Trans-Caspian Railway of Russia,
and as the saving of a long land march in the event of our desiring to take
the offensive against that Power. This line of argument was completely riddled
in a Memorandum, dated October 2nd, 1890, by General Brackenbury, at that
time Head of the Intelligence Department at home. He pointed out that a
single line to a remote corner of Persia could not counterbalance the position
of Russia in that country, would not help us in the least on the Afghan border
or in Afghan-Turkistan, and would be of no use for assuming the offensive.
He concluded by saying— c< By far the more important task is, not the con
struction of a new line into Seistan, hut the consolidation of our power there
by bringing the frontier tribes under our influence, and by developing Balu
chistan and converting it into a fertile base of operations. When this has been
done, it will he time to push forward into Persia”.
23. General Brackenhury’s criticism was destructive of the proposal
viewed as an offensive and strategical scheme. But a corresponding flaw in his
own argument was at once pointed out by Lord Salisbury, who noted that the
real object of a Seistan railway would he not to attack Russia in Northern
Persia, but to save Southern Persia from falling into her grasp, which could
be done either by a line from Quetta, or, as he would himself prefer, by a line
from the sea.
24. General Brackenhnry’s criticism was sent out to the Government of
India, and was thus noted upon by Sir G. Chesney on January 13th, 1891—
“ The railway can only he regarded as a work of military precaution. Prom this
point of view it appears to me that the time cannot he far distant when it will
be deemed necessary. Still more important is a railway from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
north to Seistan; but the connecting link between this line and the Quetta
railway system will also he found necessary”.
# 25. A little later Sir H. Brackenbury, now Military Member in India,
again noted upon the scheme; and it is interesting to read his remarks in the
light of ^ his former opinion. He now explained (April 27th, 1891) that he had
only objected to a Seistan railway so long as the Russian railway did not
extend south of the Trans-Caspian line, and because to construct a railway to
Seistan would compel her to make extensions. “ But if circumstances should
change, and if Russia should take the lead in making railways southward,
then it may become necessary for us to follow her lead. We ought to be able
to keep pace with her