'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎45r] (94/136)

72
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AW
ES.
MINUTE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY ON RUSSIAN
AMBITIONS IN EASTERN PERSIA.
It may be safely assumed that the great activity now being shown by the
Russian Government and by Russian agents in the direction of Khorasan,
Seistan, Sarhad, and Eastern Persia in general, arises, partly from alarm at the
success that is attending the Indian Trade-route to Seistan and the marked
revival of British interest in that part of the Indian frontier, still more from a
desire, while Great Britain is otherwise engaged, to accelerate that solution of
the Central Asian question to which, ever since the apocryphal will of Peter
the Great, Russian ambitions have been fondly turned, viz., the absorption of
Persia, the connection of Russian territories by railway with the Indian Ocean,
and the acquisition of a fortified naval base in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . I propose
to examine how far the realisation of these ambitions would be injurious to
British interests; a conclusion upon which point is a necessary preliminary to
the decision how far they should either be tacitly acquiesced in or openly opposed.
2. The argument that Russia can safely he permitted to secure a
maritime outlet for herself in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and that it is desirable that
Great Britain should assist, or at least not withstand, her in that consummation
rests upon a fundamental confusion of ideas. Those who employ it fail
altogether to discriminate between commercial pleas and political ambitions.
It may be urged that, whereas Russian manufactures, in their attempt to
gain access to Eastern markets, are at present compelled to make the long
and circuitous journey by the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal,
and the Red Sea, before they can reach the Indian Ocean, it would be an
advantage could they he transported by rail-roads either from the Caucasus,
or from the Caspian, to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ; although the apparent value of such
a gain would probably he a good deal discounted in practice by the com
paratively limited trade of Russia (which, however, may admit of a considerable
development in the future), still more by the superior cost of land carriage over
sea carriage. In so far as these are the ambitions of Russia, it is not probable
that any one would seriously resist their satisfaction. They can he accomplished—
provided the money be forthcoming—by amicable arrangements with Persia and
with Great Britain. I am not myself a believer in the paying capacities of a trans-
Persian line for many years to come. The country itself is poor, and cannot furnish
either the capital or the traffic. Were the line, however, an open line, it might
conceivably attract the Russian trade from one end, and the Indian trade
from the other, which would enable it to subsist. It is also conceivable that
capitalists might he willing to come forward and construct it—though were I
a capitalist I should not be found among their number—and arrangements
might he made by which, while the line remained Persian property, the con
struction and maintenance of the northern portion might be entrusted to
Russia, and those of the southern portion to Great Britain, a joint guarantee
of the three Governments being applied to the whole. This railway might
terminate on the Gulf in a Persian Port, open to the commerce of all nations, but
subject to the Import and Export dues prescribed by the Persian tariff. I
should myself regard such a venture as premature and as speculative in the
highest degree; but I do not see anything in it that need necessarily arouse
political jealousy or international complications.
3. This however, though the sentimental advocates of handing over
Persia to Russian influence do not as a rule see it, is not in the least what Russia
wants. What she desires is a railway built exclusively by Russian capital,
managed and officered entirely by Russian agents, constructed not for com
mercial but for political and strategical objects, and terminating in a Russian,