'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎48v] (101/136)

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would be necessary in that case, before the intervening State had virtually
disappeared, to consider what alternative course our interests might demand
now that the object to which our efforts had hitherto been directed was ^
longer attainable. no
Applying these principles to Persia, we have long recognized the superior
interest of Russia in the northern portion of the Shah’s dominions, which must
naturally result from the long extent of her conterminous frontier. Whatever
steps we may have taken to maintain our position in Northern Persia have
therefore been taken as much in the interests of Persia herself and of her
national independence as in our own, which are not directly threatened bv
Russian superiority in those regions, except in so far as it mi<?ht affect thk
Persian capital and seat of Government.
dn the south, on the other hand, for fully a century our efforts have been
successfully devoted to building up a substantial and pre-eminent mercantile
position, with the result that we have acquired an altogether exceptional
interest in that part of Persia. r 4
Persia herself has benefited immensely by these labours. We have cleared
the waters adjoining her coasts of pirates, and have kept them constantly
policed. It may be stated without exaggeration that the development of the
whole southern trade of Persia is due to British enterprise, and that it is by
this Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. that Bushire and Bunder Abbas have been converted into flourish
mg ports.
t systcni of telegraphs which has been introduced by the British
Indian Telegraph Administration, with the permission and assistance of the
Persian Government, has tended not merely to industrial and commercial nro
gress, but also in a remarkable degree to the consolidation of the Shah’s
authority over the centre and south of the country. & ^ 8
It cannot reasonably be supposed that Great Britain would abandon a
position attained by so many years of constant effort, or would acScn in
attempts on the part of other Powers to acquire political predominance in the
south of Persia. _ Although, therefore, His Majestv’s Government b,v.
desire to obstruct m any wav the efforts of Rn^io In ernlne nt have no
for her trade in the 0 entran “
her commerce from the north for export froSv^tnll, , ? paSSa ? e o£
admit that such commercial facilities should form the pretext for C ° Uld BOt
tion by Russia of points possessing strategical ™ Portree or for t tS'
meat of such an ascendency in the south as she already enjoys in the north
The Peisian Government should therefore distinctlv undprsfnnri i v.
m mind that Great Britain could not consent to the acquisition b f r
mill ary or naval station in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , for the reason that s^fclfn f ? a
Empire 6 t0 Great Britain and a “enaca to fie" ltdtn
Russia,^vTOuhfobe‘neoessary’for'HIs M^ 6 Go“ SU ?\ a CM , CeSsio “
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. suefi measures LIhey mSconsidef nec^r t ‘V ake iu the
or British interests / measures which, in view of their naval ^tremn^'iifTh 10 "
waters, would be attended with no serious difficulty. stle “gth in those
^ T °. r J again, could His Majesty’s Government acquiesce in tb« o
to Russia oi any preferential political rights or advantages or anv concessi . 0! J
monopoly or exclusive privilege in th P anla ^s, or any commercial
Persia, including Seistan British 7 . sou h -^stern districts of
concessions, and the Persian ^ 7 USt ' nevitab] y suffer by such
rssssE rs ssss&sg