File 4535/1928 Pt 10 ‘Persian Gulf: Anglo-Persian Negotiations 1928-30. Question of removal of Residency from Bushire.’ [‎185v] (368/460)

naturally had nothing to say against the value of naval bombardment within the
range of ships’ guns. But naval bombardment was not effective beyond the beach:
and a reference to the chart would show that, owing to the shallow waters along
the greater part of the coast, even the beach itself could not be bombarded in many
places. In support of that statement, he quoted the incident at Sur, when the
Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies had wired to the Admiralty that, in his
opinion, action by His Majesty’s ships could not permanently affect the situation
which could be done only by the occupation by British troops.
In conclusion, he asked the Committee to accept the broad principles enunciated
in the Air Staff paper on the regulation of air control in undeveloped countries; and
he suggested that the Air Ministry should then proceed as best they could with the
establishment of the strategic air route, while some arrangements on the lines of the
recommendations of the Masterton-Smith Committee’s report were being devised.
SIR SAMUEL HOARE said that he had stated in the Cabinet, and now wished
to reiterate, that the Air Ministry’s proposals were not intended to be a criticism
of any Government Department. The fact of the matter was that a new situation
had arisen with which the old machinery was not fitted to deal. There were two
entirely new problems. The first was air defence, the second the air route. He
urged acceptance of the first proposal of the Chief of the Air Staff, namely, that
the broad principles of air control should be widely circulated. This would be an
immense help to the Air Staff at home and to Air Officers Commanding abroad, since
the problem of air control was so novel that the ordinary civil official, who had never
been in contact with it, did not understand how it should be used. The second
proposal of the Chief of the Air Staff regarding the simplification of the present
complicated machinery was more controversial, and this difficult problem had
undoubted reactions on Colonial policy, Foreign policy and the policy of the Govern
ment of India. But, as the Chief of the Air Staff had emphasised, the position was at
present so dangerous, that there was substantial risk of a setback which would have
a bad moral effect on our whole position in the Middle East. In his view, it was
scarcely practical for the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Committee itself to examine in detail all
the implications of the problem; and he suggested that an Interdepartmental Sub-
Committee, on the lines of the Masterton-Smith Committee, should be set up to carrv
out a detailed inquiry into the ways and means by which the present machinery
for political control in Arabia could be quickened up. Without wishing to anticipate
the enquiries of the Sub-Committee, he thought it not unlikely that these would
include a recommendation to the effect that a Standing Interdepartmental Committee
should be set up.
LORD HAILSHAM said that of the two points at issue, the first, namely, the
question of the acceptance and circulation of the Air Staff paper, could probably be
disposed of without much difficulty. Were members in agreement with the paper
and were those concerned prepared to circulate it ?
SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN said that he would be quite willing to send
the paper in question for information to all political officers with whom the Foreign
Office were concerned.
SIR JOHN SHUCKBURGH observed that, in the absence of the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, he could not commit his Department, but he thought that the
paper required further detailed examination before it was finally accepted and
circulated.
LORD PEEL had no objection to circulating the paper, subject to the
reservation that his Department were given the opportunity of examining it in detail.
LORD CUSHENDEN drew attention to the following passage, paragraph 4 :
“ It is of the highest importance once the necessary authority is obtained
or in cases where reference to a higher authority is not required—that the local
political authority should come to a prompt decision in conjunction with the Air
Officer Commanding, both on the initiation of air action and on its extension
when the situation demands it within the limit of his instructions.”
He suggested that the Air Officer Commanding could have nothing to do with
the initiation of air action.
SIR HUGH TRENCHARD observed that the position was safeguarded by the
emphasis on the words “ once the necessary authority is obtained.”
SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN suggested, and the Committee agreed, that
nothing would be lost if the words in parenthesis were cut out.