File 299/1918 Pt 2 'Persia - policy; Shiraz situation; Bushire operations' [‎53r] (111/605)

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Telegram P., No. 636, dated the 10th (received 11th) October 1919.
TProm His Britannic Majesty’s Consul, Shiraz, . , .p ,
To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India m the Foreign and Political
h Department, Simla (repeated to Tehran and Bushire).
On the afternoon of October 8th, I retnrned from Kawar and had to see
Tarman Farma and Orton before replying to your telegram No. HOO-S. of the
Srd October. I regret the delay.
2 When it was decided to withdraw the troops from Shiraz in the
autumn it was assumed here at least that during the spring the rebel Khans
would be smashed. This was not done and the situation then anticipated
does not now esist.^ ^ ^ here that until Zair Khidar and Shaikh Hussain
have been settled, road will not be safe. Governor-General prop ses giving
them one more chance of submission and then strike hard at once. I heir
attitude of defiance at the recent interview at Samal shows how far they still
are from obedience to the orders of Government. Though they may remain
cuiescent while the Indian troops are on road they are oniy waiting to
re-establish themselves. Their intrinsic importance is slight but they form
sole remaining focus of active rebellion and many old adherents of other
rebellious Khans would flock to them if the smallest encouragement were
forthcoming. Once they are thoroughly defeated in field, or forced to take
refuge in Shiraz or elsewhere, no serious menace to road will remain.
Settlement of Kashgai question still remains to be effected but I do
not expect great trouble unless our own action revives the hopes ot mischief-
makers. As His Highness said yesterday Soulat keeps quiet but is looking m
every direction. Next few weeks will see the migration completed, during this
period we should not reduce our strength in the country and even (gr. undec.)
ordered out are to be deprecated.
5 If all goes well Indian garrison could be considerably reduced at end
of year or in early spring without danger but complete withdrawal should in
my opinion be postponed till remodelling of South Persia Rifles has beeu
carried out and their numbers increased, ,
6. Probably Orton will telegraph his own views hut I believe that most
South 'Persia Rifles could do at present would be to hold Shira z and Kazerun
and the intervening road, without any reserves for expeditions. Rapid
recruiting can scarcely be expected till new scheme for Persian Army is shaped,
7. Exact location of Indian troops is less material, save that the presence
nf Iroons on Bushire Island alone would have small deterrent effect, while still
affording grievance to nationalist sentiment. Requirement of punishment
ol Zair Khidar must have first place but, as I told Elsmie last week, it appears
to me desirable that some infantry should remain at Shiraz as well as cavalry
and artillery whose numbers are small until after Kashgar migration. As
“au/as desired might be. sent to Kazerun or to road making a ter that
quite small force staying here possibly described as Consular Guard though I
doubt whether that name would help politically.
ft As exnected Earman Parma dislikes idea of withdrawal of troops and
regards it L inconsistent with agreement. He says we should either keep
troops, not necessarily present number, but an adequate force, here or else
completely withdraw and simultaneously hand over South Persia Rifles
leaving British officers only as instructors thus giving (? it a purely Persian
character). But half measures will be fatal. It is not likely he would stay
to experiment. He was so taken aback by the suggestion at. evacuation that
the only bright thought that occurred to him was that we might continue to
nay for sufficient riflemen to keep road passable for British trade.
9 Undoubtedly South Persia Rifles greatly improved their position and
moral by their Ispahan expedition, but I am very doubtful whether they are
vet fit to cope ' with Kashgai or even the augmented forces of Zair Khidar
without at least moral bapking from Indian troops.
10. Aeroplanes are still feared but their material effectiveness oyer so
vast and so rugged au area was always doubtful and their moral effect as
been greatly 1 reduced by general knowledge of accidents they have suffered.
Kebels do not regard odds between planes and themselves as excessive. Ihi
js agreed in generally by Qrton, who has seen.