'Formation of XVII Divnfor service in Mesopotamia' [‎50r] (101/106)

S j 5 C R iD T,
Operations*
From: G.O.G. Mesopotamia.
To: C.-in-C., India.
Repeated Col.G.b.
6th August, 1917.
8,20 p.m.
I have "been hoping every day that I should get
news that the Russians had decided upon offensive on all
fronts here and that it was about to commence, for, owing to
approach of winter (groups omitted) as regards their army
in mountains.
I have received your 39032 cipher M.0.2, which
indicates that Russian troops are being withdrawn from
'Vf Caucasus front to Europe. This, added to absence of news of
• definite plans by Russians and continued and apparently
increasing demoralisation of their army, drives me reluctant
ly to conclusion which I have delayed as long as it was safe
to do so, that there is no probability of sustained offensive
of any weight by Russians in this theatre this winter.
In my X.2713 July 4th in reply to your 37077
cipher July 2nd (groups omitted) this of action taken.by me
to bring up every battalion that I could reasonably withdraw
from my communications and of organization proposed for them.
This organization was adequate to enable them to fulfil
functions which I then expected to be able to assign to them
and they received welcome addition of 4 fighting battalions
offered by India, 3 of which have reached this country al
ready. But ? subsequent developments, as above, must result
in making necessary increased activity by this force (?mainly)
on 3 lines, namely, Dialha - Tigris and Euphrates, and I must
perforce review my plans and re-cast my organization slightly
in order to make adequate provision for command and handling.
Increased mobilityuon one part will be essential and even
though there is no^definite information of such intention in
any strength so far we must be prepared for hostile movement
down Euphrates. I have all along realised undesirability of
asking for additional troops in view of magnitude of calls
elsewhere; it seems to me, hov/ever, that moment has come
when, owing to distance at which we are situated here from
England and India, further delay would be wrong.
I would submit, therefore, that best and most
economical way of bringing about improvement I advocate would
be by forming another division , which would give me, apart
from cavalry division, 2 Corps and 2 Divisions, these latter
being available to reinforce either Corps, to hold Dialha or
Euphrates line, or to act as general reserve as required.
Towards
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