'Mesopotamia. Commission' [‎106r] (214/256)

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3rd .Marc I. 1915. >lXA6
■Ui4j». ^V r o n£rree thaf
' Ida
a^rce thal the position of
mav be face<l shortly with a serious
** Ti 4 i i!, l i n in. fm mj Viceroy/Mated
Your telegram of the 23rd ultimo
Force 4 I) ’ gives cause for great anxiety and that \vt
attack on llasra.
^ It is diflicult to obtain reliable information as to distribution of Turkish forces, but we
hear of at least three divisions (other than the 35th) which cannot be precisely located and
arc reported to be destined for Mesopotamia. If this be so the enemy might attack llasra ***
with forces considerably superior to ours and with a large number of Arab
Tim rii f 1 Im jri;T : '
-prrvetrl—m I in
h a 11
tuxiliar
estined for
forces considerably superior to ours and with
and this might happen within the next month or six wee
lil--b- t‘" r f r .y.o niiiifi I ioirj--to—rii hrn—side
-err 1
newly i■■ |rrwir‘ i ~ ri p ii u y iin*
oppn.-ontTr-sit Ai d'oeks an- transferring troops to the I'lii|ihi 1 1 1 It nontiTTiiTi difficult task to
smash their nl 1 imTi I f 1 1 lopi »i m r tin ii (icnmia n ;ol\d ^t-ryriTreii()t likely to allow the Turks to
make the miMakc of coming withii71jT?T^i»t f > rt1s1an ce of Hasia until they have concentrated
their forces. Thev could t hep^u FrrrtTce on a v idc^TP^urt-snlr,i ,l ‘ ,f suitable arrangements for
supplvin'T I In ii i i l "|hl tVTmy u hii h would be in the 'h ill nTTii ll i onhl ph'b ibl > be made.
UariadtJiSM'rJlt^present 14.l*>0 men and U) guns including his detachment at Ahwa/ and won4d
•lli 1 ” Ihi ;t 1 ( ■!
^ As regards our resources we are as you say to receive three battalions from China though
the date of arrival of 3t»(h Sikhs seems very doubtful. Kven so we shall bp better off by two
battalions onlv since we have had to send the 18th Infantry to China to replace one of them.
Assuming that we send Harrell another brigade as you snir irc s t this would give him 17.4O0
ln ,. n onl\ . (jiirT'i'i ilii.iji m In lm e< rh't(ri ioeatitig'iwteeindly iitw fronlile on the Frontier in the
men onlv. (dm 1 pm ilii.ni m India m rtrtrviMent mg ire
spring is probable enougTT find must be provided for
^•Taking Maskat and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. together we can draw nothing froin there. 1 he
102nd are so inefficient from fever that we must withdraw and replace them. The 35th must
take up all the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. detachments which in the present position of affairs cannot be
reduced and may have to be strengthened. Mn*> i4*nan tunopi mho in the miiin-tn v, .e twmi
r ■!.. <ii Hmi.n ..bib, m i.riurpt be-Muc what thwr
.. t i i i n . 1.. w, .n li 1 b" ' 1 * ^‘*t-
-oent iicph' to
tn link*. iM HiHllllIlKllH-
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Keontie
-wdion a
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J-cLtuL
■M.ai. being
I.,,.! I, w liffii nil I | ii - II ~ 1 l ’ ^ It seems to us that those
who are directing the strategy of the Empire should give the situation in Mesopotamia their most
cawfut consideration. Adilea.t-H»m.(w.vvould be disastrims tot^yj^ition in Asmjijjd witlidrawal
from that oonnti w which miidit be onhm dteriiative would be little better. While we fully
“recognise tlie great issues in Europe we cannoTS^N in Fiast Africa as in any way vital compared
to those in Mesopotamia. Such information a/reaches us from East Africa seems to show that
there is no serious threat to British East Africa. The withdrawal of one brigade of good
troops from East Africa still leaves seven battalions there, nm t if llii.ni, it ItTTHUh ul mb nor
’’ u.ilIuI 'rm I he di'ITllSi U 1 . A certain amount (of pressure
seems to be contemplated, and with the rainy season about to
‘ p 1 ' i i y lull .lib 1 'i 11 n i li b*—
from Belgian Cong.'
commence there seems no chance of serious operations against Colony for some Ume to come.
In these circumstances we would press urgently that the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment,
29th Punjabis 2nd Kashpiir Bides, and 13th Rajputs should be sent to Mesopotamia with the
least possible delay. This would leave Wapshare the 98th, 101st, 130th Baluchis, Gist. 63rd,
3rd Kashmir Hides, and the Gwalior, Jhind, Bharatpur, Kapurthala and Rampnr Infantry,
besides his local white volunteers, the King's African Rides, hi^ oth er loca l trop ps tin
contingent from Rhodesia and the Corps of Frontiersmen of which we have heard. \\ e have
ventured to make these suggestions in view of refusal of our proposal that Indian troops n«>u
in F>vpt should be returned for the service and the protection of Indian interests m
Mesopotamia and at Aden. Our military resources in India have now been i educed to
bed-rock, and we are onlv able to reinforce Barrett with such items as two battalions which
-will be replaced bv two battalions from China, the 7th Mariana Lancers and a second heavy
battery now on their way to Basra, one battery Territorial Artillery, and possibly a battalion
of Nabha Imperial Infantry. We share your view that it is imperative that Barrett s forces
should be increased to two divisions. You are no doubt aware that since the outbreak of war
we have sent overseas six divisions of infantry and nearly three divisions of cavalry, while m
return for 33 battalions of British infantrv we have received 35 battalions of Territorial
infantry of mixed value. India lias, therefore, done her duty to the Empire, and it is quite
impossible, in view of situation on the Frontier mnl in intni^w, to do more. It is of no use to
suggest to us that we should take further risks in India. We have heavx responsibilities
towards European and native population that cannot be lightly set aside. ^ Our conclusion,
therefore, is that though we are at one with you in thinking that Barrett s force should be
m increased to at least t wo divisions, we are unable in consequence of our generosity towards
^ His Majesty's Government in the early stages of the war to tind the necessary troops to
complete them, and that responsibility 'rests with His Majesty's Government not merely to
find the necessary additional troops, but for any consequences that may arise due to their
refusal to allow India the u se of her own troops to protect her own interests.
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