'Mesopotamia. Commission' [‎117v] (237/256)

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possible to reinforce Nixon from elsewhere than from India, he must remain at Kut-m-
Amara. On the other hand, from a political point of view, capture of Bagdad would create
an immense impression in Middle East, ■oaporially in Bawd** Afghanistan, and on our frontier,
and would counteract unfortunate impression created by want of success in Dardanelles, it
would also isolate German parties in Persia, probably produce pacificating effect in that country,
and frustrate German plan of raising Afghanistan and the tribes, while impression throughout
Arabia would be striking. In India effect would undoubtedly be good. These are
considerations to which 1 attach great importance, but 1 put them forward to be weighed by
you and His Majesty’s Government, for I fully realise that it is for His Majesty's Government
to decide where and how our forces can be used with the best possible effect.
No. ftS
Secretary of State for India to General Si.ron, dated Sth October 1915.
(Telegraphic.) .
With what addition to your present force are you confident that you can both occupy
and hold Bagdad ? Reply direct and repeat reply to Government of India.
No.>9^
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated S/A October 191.).
(Telegraphic.) T . , „ . .
Private. Reference to my telegram of to-day to INixon repeated to you. t abinet are so
impressed with great political and military advantages of occupation of Bagdad that we
shall make every effort to supply necessary force. We do not wish to attempt it with
insufficient forces. Are you satisfied that one division is sufficient ?
No. >85^
General Ni.ron to Secretary of State for India, dated 'ctb October 1915.
(Telegraphic.) , , ,
Your telegram of 8th. 1 am confident that 1 can beat Nur-ed-dm and occupy Bagdad
without anv addition to mv present force. But if Turks should turn their serious attention to
the recovery of Bagdad and should send to Mesopotamia the large organised forces which
would be necessary for such an operation, then 1 consider that 1 should require one division
(and I should like also one white Cavalry Regiment) in addition to my present force to watch
both the. Tigris and Euphrates lines of communication and defeat the enemy as he comes
within xeach. Further, the Bagdad position would be best from which to do this.
Kut is 108 miles, amj Townshend at Aziziyah is 48 from Bagdad by road.
No.
General Xiron to Secretary of State for India, dated S/A October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Enemy at Zeur reported reinforced. I have told lownshend that in view of enemy s
more forward action 1 Wiust leave measures to be taken to his discretion. Headquarters,
Cavalry Brigade, and half -t S ” Battery have reached him and 16th Brigade with two more
field, one howitzer and one maxim battery, join him 9th. He has asked for 1 /th Brigade,
which has been despatched and should reach him 11th.
Na.>9S^
Yiceififato Secretary of State for India, dated 9th October 1915.
(Telegraphic.) , x „ „
Private. Your private telegram of the 30th ultimo, torce I). tour message was
communicated by me to Nixon, who asks me to send the following reply:
“ Your kind and inspiriting message of 30th was delayed and only received to-day, and on
behalf of General Townshend and the 6th Division, to whom the credit for the victory
belongs, I desire to say how deeply it is appreciated by them and me.
No.*?^
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 9th October 191.).
(Telegraphic.) „ . „ , . £
Private. Hope to give you definite information as to possibility of reinforcement m a tew
d a y S . Meanwhile, Nixon should maintain his present position and be prepared to advance
if reinforcements asked for can be sent to him. Please instruct him aceoidingly .
No.^&Hs
Viceroy to Secr'dary of State for India, dated 9/A Octobi
191:
(Telegraphic.) ^ , . , , , , , , ^
Private. Your private telegram of the 8th instant and Nixons telegram of the same
date. I am glad of the decision of Cabinet. After consulting the Commander-in-Chief, I
think that Nixon is in the best position to judge as to the number of troops required,
and when he mentions a division we understand him to mean a fully organised division
with its proper proportion of British troops and guns and its divisional Cavalry. In
addition to this he ask* for a Cavalry Regiment. VVe are prepared to accept his opinion, but
think that it will alsd^fc necessary to insure that British units now with him are kept up to
strength bv drafts fro^i home, as India cannot supply these. Ae wdl keep ihe Indian units
full \Ve mav add that reinforcing troops should reach Bagdad not later than one month
after its capture, as this is the period which we calculate must elapse before the Turks could
concentrate in strength to attempt its recapture.