Proposed Withdrawal of British Troops from Morar and Gwalior [‎101v] (20/32)

This statement, however, is not home out by the map of Gwalior. A small
noint on the hill commands a portion of the fort, but is itself commanded by
the higher portion of the fort, and taken obliquely m flank from both extremi-
ties of the latter.
I am afraid such promises could not be considered of much value. We
may be pretty certain that we should not occupy the hill without a battle, and
then we should he a long way from the possession of the fort which is perched
Imml,-™] feet high, is more than a mile long, and has a snffl.
cient supply of water.
With reference to the third item of the recommendations, it is not clear
how we shall take up a position which would enable us to act with greater force
and certainty of success than at present, since we shall have withdrawn the
force now at Gwalior from the fort and cantonment, and the disposal of it
as shadowed in the text of the despatch amounts to some addition to the exist-
ing garrison of Agra, and the distribution of the rest of the troops wherever
existing shelter may he available.
If a charge of want of good faith is raised in the face of the emphatic
declaration of Colonel Meade, who conducted the negotiation with Scindiah
reo’ardin 0, the fort and cantonments of Morar, what may not he said hereafter
when we shall be seen in possession of the territory and its revenue which we
obtained for the purpose of maintaining troops to preserve order in Gwalior,
and there will he no such recognizable body in existence; when the subsidiary
force will be nominally withdrawn to Agra and represented, perhaps, by an
additional wing of a British regiment at Agra, a regiment of cavalry hidden
at Muttra, and a British infantry regiment added to Chukrata.
There will he a standing and irresistible temptation, under financial pres
sure, gradually to diminish this counterpoise to the military danger of Gwalior,
when we have placed the latter out of our sight.
It has not been ascertained that there is suitable ground for the force at
Agra, and it is doubtful if there is such ground. This would furnish a reason
for dissolving the subsidiary force amongst the forces of India.
Scindiah, or his successor, might reasonably say,—yon enjoy the produce of
a part of my territory, but where is the subsidiary force for which you are
paid ? It wall be an unsatisfactory answer to hunt up the force from half
a dozen scattered cantonments.
A very strong argument for the abandonment of Morar is the sickness
of the troops. This w r as not alw r ays so !
The cantonment used to he healthy, and was a favorite station of the
Contingent. When its continued occupation was determined on, the opinion of
Dr. .Forsyth, the Inspector General, Medical Department, was not unfavorable
to it.
The shelter of the troops was at first very bad indeed, for the most part
similar to stables; and the continued occupation was determined only on the
understanding that the very best description of shelter which the Government
could devise, should be constructed to counteract the climate. In pursuance of
this resolution, some very fine buildings have been constructed, but unfortu
nately instead of screening every part of the v T alls that was possible from the
sun, the large arches of the verandah’ admit, unchecked, the full heat of the
sun’s rays, while the masonry of the verandahs is too massive ; hut these defi
ciencies are remediable,—they were pointed out many months ago, hut no sun
shade or screen of any kind was furnished to protect the soldiers during the
last hot weather, without which the heat could not be other than intolerable.
This shelter, in fact, has never been fairly tried, and the value of the large outlay
has been lost for want of a comparatively small outlay to complete it.
The general sanitary condition of the station has, I believe, been greatly
injured, and causes of sickness produced, by ignorance and mismanagement.
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