'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎13v] (26/1386)

expressed the opinion 1
two .Divisions, or one c
n that if the Government desiied to occupy Baghdad,
> closely supported by another, exclusive of communi
cation troops, were necessary. . . * i r
At that time he had under his command his own envision with lour or
live squadrons and three batteries of 18-pounders and foui heavy guns.
The pursuit expended itself owing to the difficult} °f getting on, and a l
question of an advance to Baghdad was in abeyance.
About the same day 1 was informed that anothei division would almost
certainlv be sent, and this was communicated to Geneial lownshend.
Accordingly 1 continued, as the tactical situation required, to biing up vhat
reinforcements were available in the country, and in due course incieased
the force under General Townshend by another brigade of infantiy, tw<>
regiments of cavalry, and a horse battery, and to the Naval flotilla vvas
added H.M.S. “Firefly,” with a 4-inch gun. In addition, communication
troops were provided for Kut. ^ .
r riie decision to send two divisions from France arrived on the -4th
October, and General Townshend had proposed alternative schemes of
advance with a view to the occupation of Baghdad, but General Townshend
did not express to me the view that the force being placed at his disposal
would be inadequate for the purpose.
From Kut 1 sent the Major-General, General Staff, by aeroplane to see
General Townshend and discuss personally with him the plans submitted.
Major-General Kemball thus visited him* on the 19th October and the 5th
November, and on return gave no inkling that General 1 ownshend was in
doubt as to the adequacy of the force that would be under his command.
Whatever opinion General lownshend may have previously held belore
reinforcements were promised, it was quite clear that the final confirmation
of the coming of two divisions from France had satisfied him that the
conditions he mentioned at the beginning of the month were fulfilled.
1 have, Ac.,
John Nixon, (Jencral.
No. 8.
From Viceroy, Army Department, 1 Oth April 1916.
C—Our telegram of Oth April (No. 6 above). Following received from
General Officer Commanding Force “ D.”
“ The following telegram, in answer to a question I put to him, has been
received from Townshend, dated 7th April. (Becjins) 1 To avoid any chance of
misunderstanding 1 trust that this my reply may be permitted to go in my
own words. My opinion most certainly was that we were taking a grave risk
in continuing a strategic movement against Baghdad with my weak Division
alone, the British battalions of which were reduced to half their strength,
and besides this the drafts to replace casualties at the battle of Kut consisted
of raw recruits from India while there were no other troops to support me
and the distance to the sea was over 300 miles. Further, the indications
were that the Turks were holding and containing our troops in the Gallipoli
area and that in order to save Baghdad they would without doubt send
reinforcements to Mesopotamia. Notwithstanding the fact that General
Nixon gave me his confidence and that the entire conduct of the
operations commencing in May with Kurna and Amara up to the present
time had been given to me by him it will be obvious that it w r as most
difficult for me in my ])Osition as a subordinate commander to give my views
to the Army Commander unless he asked for them.
“ ‘ Nevertheless it seemed to me that it was my absolute duty to point out
to him the risk of advancing with my present force to attack Ctesiphon, well
known to be a strong position, and to occupy Baghdad. Having called
his attention to the risk, my conscience was clear, and I was prepared
to carry out any orders given me by him. Therefore, on the 3rd October,