'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎23r] (45/1386)

15
coinnmnil} on ilu* Jth, flis Ii.xcellcncy jnade tlio following remarks re^ardin^
the future of Basra: - & & 8
^ on are, of course, aware that, in the yreat struggle in which we are involved, wo are
not hg iting sin”le-handed, and we cannot therefore lay down plans for the future without
full exchange of views with the other gicat Powers who are our Allies, hut
may be permitted to indulge a very confident assurance that henceforth _
administration will bring back to Iraq that prosperitv to which her rich potentialities "ive
her so clear a title. *
a
in any case we
a more benign
()n tlie oih February the \ iceroy, escorted by a squadron of cavalry, rode
out to Sbaiba On the following day he proceeded up stream to Kurna, and
on the < th ho re-embarked on his return journey to India.
At the end of January the general position was somewhat as follows :--At
!\asariyeh lurks and Arabs were collecting for an attack on Basra by the
desert route to /oboir. In the Ivurna direction the l urks were in consider-
able iorce, but unlikely to attack owing to the strength of the Kurna position.
()n the Karim side the menace was becoming formidable, the Turks were
approaching, Jehad was being widely preached and the Arab tribesmen
^eie iipe foi an armed rising against the Sheikh of Muhaminerah and
ourselves. The Sheikh had meanwhile lodged a protest at Teheran against
the Turkish violation of Persian territory. On our side the position was
that we had approximately a Brigade in a strong defensive position at
Kurna, and two Brigades at and around Basra, while a fourth Brigade
was being got ready for embarkation in India. British subjects had
been withdrawn from Ahwaz and the Comet and Shushan had been sent up
the Karim to give moral support to the Vice-Consul and our adherents at
Ahwaz. This, however, did not altogether satisfy the Secretary of State as
sufficient considering the importance of the pipe line, the vital' necessity of
preventing the spread of Jehad, and the urgency of asserting our military
superiority at the head of the Gulf. Accordingly on the 1st February he
despatched the following telegram : —
" Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated
1st February 1915.
“No. 1615. Your 3501. I quite agree that Basra and Kurna are more important factors
in military situation than Karun. and must be the first consideration; but if situation in
Shalt region is. in Barrett s opinion, such that troops can be temporarily spared for defence
of latter, it may be prudent to support the Sheikh, as Turkish success on that side mbdit
have a very far-reaching political effect, and directly endanger our military position at Basra
and Kurna.. It is to enable Barrett to act, if necessary, in Karun direction, that 1 have
obtained concurrence of Foreign Office, who have informed Teheran.
“ The question simply resolves itself into whether Barrett is confident that he can or not
safely detach troops during this week pending arrival of 12 <h Brigade. Prompt support now
may obviate larger military efforts later.
“ As regards reinforcements from Egypt or England 1 will reply later.”
On the 3rd February the Foreign Office telegraphed to our Minister at
Teheran—
“ No. 30. M v telegram No. 27 (of 31st .lanuary).
“ Owing to increased Turkish and Arab activity in the direction of our oil fields, it has
become necessary to send small force of Infantry up the Karun. His Majestv’s Ships
Shaitan ami Com ’t with Consul and 30 British Infantry arrived Ahwaz 31st January, where
all was found quiet. The 7th Rajputs have now started up river. You should inform
Persian Government, explaining that 11 is Majesty's Government have been compelled to take
these measures for the defence of their interests and property in default of any effective Persian
force sufficient to guarantee those regions against Turkish invasion, and that this defensive
measure, in the absence <>t any other possible means of protection, is the sole object of the
movement.
To this Sir V. Townley replied on the same, and following day—
“ No. 17, confidential, dated 3rd February 1915. Your telegram No. 28.
•“ Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that necessary instructions have been sent to the
Sheikh of Muhammerali and to Baklitiaris to resist Turko-Arnb incursion. His Highness
infers Turkish objective would appear to be Muhammerali to punish Sheikh, who is accused
of having assisted us to take Basra. Turkish Ambassador in saying this added that he would
be punished as Sheikh of Koweit has been punished- Rumour is current that the latter has
been killed. Minister was unwilling to commit himself definitely on question of possible
defensive expedition up Karun.
•• No. 52, dated 4th February 1915. My telegram No. 17.
'• I could uct no definite annonneenmnt from Minister for Foreign Affairs as to how the
Persian G nerunient would view a British expedition up the Karun, but lie allowed that it was