'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎24r] (47/1386)

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Correspondence seized is. in the case of a^ent at Ahwaz, llelinlicli, so inenminating as to
justify liis treatment as a prisoner of war. Case of M uliammei all agent, named Holst, is
still under consideration.
On the 8th the Secretary of State approved the diversion of “S ” Battery,
R.H.A., to Basra, and further telegraphed —
“ Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated
8 th February 1915.
" KUO. In view of recent developments up Karun and arrival of 1-tli Brigade do you
now propose to send reinforcement to 7th Rajputs at Ahwaz ? if so, 1 authorise despatch, hut
please report at ouee so that 1 may inform 1 oreign OHiee.
Jt was evident that the executive authorities both in India and Mesopo
tamia were now alarmed, and might he expected to take all necessary
military action. The Secretary of State therefore telegraphed as follows:--
•• Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy. Army Department, dated
9th February 1915.
•• Kill. With reference to Cox’s telegram 203 B, with Consul's recommendation to
strengthen force at Aliwaz and Barrett's 129 C. My telegram 1640 authorising reinforce
ments disposes of necessity for further orders. The question now is purely military and may
necessitate active military measures at once if strength and distribution of Barrett's Force
admits of such with due regard to enemy's disposition in Kurna and Nasiriyeh directions.”
By the 12th February the situation at Ahwaz had become still more
threatening, and the Oliicer Commanding the 7th Rajputs at Ahwaz was
pressing for early reinforcement. The Secretary of State was more than
ever convinced that the immediate increase of the Force in Mesopotamia
was expedient, and on that date he authorised the despatch of the following
telegram :—
“ Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated
12th February 1915.
“ 1646. Reference my 1615 of 1st February and my 1628 of 5th February to which no
reply yet received. War Office now state definitely that they cannot provide reinforcements
for India from either Fgypt or Fugland and that they cannot send any to Aden until it is
certain that no serious attack is being made on the Canal. 1 should therefore be glad to have
your views at once as to how, in ease of emergency, you now propose to provide the troops
necessarv to make position in .Mesopotamia secure as 1 am strongly of opinion that some such
emergency is more than possible. The course of events on the Karuu side exemplifies the
necessitv for prompt action. Had we been able to despatch an adequate force at once it is
conceivable that the Arabs along Ivarun would not have risen against us and destroyed the
pipe-line.’
On the I 7th Sir Arthur Barrett reported that he had sent a column under
Brigadier-General Delamain to check the Turkish advance north-west of
Shaiba. On the same date skirmishes were reported LI miles north-west of
Ahwaz between our cavalry patrols and Arabs. The pipe-line was cut in
several places, and the manager at the A badan works reported that the supply
of oil stored at Abadan would be exhausted before the middle of March.
Each day things looked blacker. News had been received of the untoward
death in action of Captain Shakespear, who had been killed by a stray shot
in a combat between our ally Bin Saood and his hated rival Bin Rashid.
Prior to the war Captain Shakespear had been a pillar of strength in
upholding our cause among the lickle Arab tribes, and his death at this
juncture was a grievous misfortune. On the 21st February, Army Head
quarters in India telegraphed that 3,000 Turks with 18 guns and numerous
Aral) horsemen from Nasariyeh were approaching Xaikhaileh 20 miles
north-west of Basra. Lord Crewe felt that the time had come to intervene
and to insist on reinforcements being sent. Under his orders the following
telegram was therefore despatched:
••Teleoram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated
23rd February 1915.
•• No 1661 Your 11. 3321. 1 am anxious regarding Force “ D," ns the enemy will every
dnvovt stron« er and it seems very desirable that we should smash their advanced forces as
sooths'possible’ otherwise we mav be confronted with a serious attack on Basra itself. I
have 'endeavoured to x-et the War Office to send out further reinforcements to India, but it
s( i ems i lo peiess, and of course we must recognise the great issues that lace us in Europe, which
thev re-ard as Vital to success and of paramount importance
., (jn ( | c r these circumstances I should be glad if you could see your way to form another
brigade for the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. without relief from home. You will be getting three battalions
from China
in,m i nun siuntlv and we might anticipate their arrival by detailing Hirer Indian battalions
fra u Ludii for sei-viee in Gulf, <»• perhaps you could now spare one battalion from Muscat.
C
.M.S. 137.